The provided information describes a malspam campaign dated September 14, 2016, distributing malicious scripts packaged as .wsf files inside .zip archives. The campaign is titled "Account report" and involves sending emails with attachments designed to deceive recipients into opening the malicious .wsf script. Windows Script Files (.wsf) can contain scripts written in VBScript or JScript, which, when executed, can perform a wide range of actions including downloading additional malware, executing commands, or modifying system settings. The use of .zip archives is a common tactic to bypass email filters and entice users to open the attachments. Although specific payload details are not provided, such campaigns typically aim to compromise user systems for purposes such as credential theft, establishing persistence, or delivering secondary malware. The campaign is classified as malware with a low severity rating and no known exploits in the wild beyond the malspam distribution itself. No affected software versions or patches are indicated, suggesting this is a social engineering and scripting-based threat rather than an exploitation of a software vulnerability.

For European organizations, this malspam campaign poses a risk primarily through user interaction leading to execution of malicious scripts. The impact can range from localized system compromise to broader network infiltration if the malware establishes persistence or spreads laterally. Confidentiality may be compromised if credential theft or data exfiltration occurs. Integrity and availability impacts depend on the payload delivered by the script, which is unspecified but could include ransomware or destructive malware in other variants. Given the low severity rating and absence of known exploits beyond the initial malspam, the threat is moderate but still significant due to the potential for successful social engineering. European organizations with large user bases and less mature email filtering or user awareness programs are more vulnerable. The campaign's age (2016) suggests it may be less relevant today but could still be a vector if similar tactics are reused.

Specific mitigation steps include: 1) Enhancing email filtering to detect and quarantine emails containing .zip attachments with .wsf files, using signature and heuristic analysis. 2) Implementing strict attachment handling policies that block or sandbox executable script files received via email. 3) Conducting targeted user awareness training focusing on the risks of opening unexpected attachments, especially those with scripting extensions. 4) Employing endpoint protection solutions capable of detecting and blocking script-based malware execution. 5) Utilizing application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized script execution. 6) Monitoring network traffic for unusual outbound connections that may indicate secondary payload download or command and control communication. 7) Regularly updating and patching all systems to reduce the risk of secondary exploitation. These measures go beyond generic advice by focusing on script-specific controls and user behavior relevant to this campaign.