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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2025-40924: HAARG Catalyst::Plugin::Session · Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers

Affects HAARG Catalyst::Plugin::SessionSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 10:12 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 17 Jul 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
HAARG Catalyst::Plugin::SessionAffected
  • =0.01
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

  1. Immediate upgrade: Organizations should upgrade Catalyst::Plugin::Session to version 0.44 or later, where the session ID generation mechanism has been improved to use cryptographically secure random number generators.
  2. Patch backporting: For environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, backport patches that replace the built-in rand() with a cryptographically secure RNG (e.g., Perl's Crypt::Random or /dev/urandom) and increase entropy sources.
  3. Session management review: Implement additional session security controls such as regenerating session IDs upon authentication, enforcing short session lifetimes, and binding sessions to client IP or user-agent where appropriate.
  4. HTTP header hardening: Remove or restrict HTTP Date headers to reduce information leakage about epoch time.
  5. Monitoring and detection: Deploy anomaly detection to identify suspicious session ID patterns or repeated session fixation attempts.
  6. Security testing: Conduct penetration testing focused on session management to verify the effectiveness of mitigations.
  7. User education: Inform developers about the importance of cryptographically secure random number generation in session management to prevent recurrence.

Description

Catalyst::Plugin::Session before version 0.44 for Perl generates session ids insecurely. The session id is generated from a (usually SHA-1) hash of a simple counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID and the current Catalyst context. This information is of low entropy. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.

References

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