The threat described pertains to the Turla group, a well-known advanced persistent threat (APT) actor, and their ongoing infrastructure activities as observed through OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) methods. Turla is recognized for sophisticated cyber espionage campaigns, often targeting governmental, military, and diplomatic entities worldwide. The reference to "Snakes in the Satellites" suggests that Turla's infrastructure may leverage satellite-based communication channels or satellite internet services to conduct command and control (C2) operations, enhancing their stealth and resilience against takedown attempts. This technique allows the threat actor to bypass traditional terrestrial network monitoring and censorship, complicating detection and attribution efforts. The information is sourced from CIRCL and PassiveTotal, indicating that the data is derived from passive DNS and other OSINT sources, highlighting the persistence and ongoing nature of Turla's infrastructure. Although no specific vulnerabilities or exploits are detailed, the medium severity rating and the threat level indicate a credible and active espionage threat. The lack of known exploits in the wild suggests this is more about infrastructure monitoring rather than a newly discovered exploit. The technical details and indicators are limited, but the emphasis on OSINT and infrastructure points to a strategic, stealthy approach by Turla to maintain long-term access to targeted networks via satellite communication channels.

For European organizations, especially those in government, defense, critical infrastructure, and diplomatic sectors, the Turla group's use of satellite-based infrastructure for C2 operations poses significant risks. The ability to use satellite communications can circumvent traditional network defenses and monitoring tools, increasing the likelihood of prolonged undetected presence within networks. This can lead to extensive data exfiltration, espionage, and potential manipulation of sensitive information. The stealth and resilience of such infrastructure complicate incident response and attribution, potentially delaying mitigation efforts. Additionally, the geopolitical sensitivity of European countries makes them attractive targets for espionage campaigns by sophisticated threat actors like Turla. The impact extends beyond confidentiality to potential integrity and availability concerns if the threat actor escalates their activities. The medium severity suggests that while the threat is credible, it may require specific targeting and resources, limiting broad opportunistic exploitation but posing a serious risk to high-value targets.

European organizations should enhance their network monitoring capabilities to include detection of satellite-based communication patterns and anomalies. This involves integrating telemetry from satellite internet providers where possible and employing advanced network traffic analysis tools capable of identifying unusual encrypted or non-standard communication channels. Collaboration with satellite service providers to share threat intelligence and indicators of compromise (IOCs) related to Turla's infrastructure is recommended. Organizations should also conduct regular threat hunting exercises focused on APT behaviors, including lateral movement and persistence mechanisms that may leverage unconventional communication paths. Implementing strict network segmentation and zero-trust principles can limit the lateral spread if initial compromise occurs. Additionally, improving endpoint detection and response (EDR) capabilities to identify stealthy malware and C2 communications is critical. Given the stealthy nature of this threat, investing in threat intelligence sharing platforms within Europe can help identify emerging infrastructure changes and tactics used by Turla. Finally, training security teams to recognize the signs of satellite-based C2 and espionage techniques will improve detection and response times.