SOC files: an APT41 attack on government IT services in Africa
Chinese cyberespionage group APT41 conducted a targeted attack against government IT services in Africa. The attackers used various tools including Impacket, Cobalt Strike, and custom malware for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. They leveraged DLL sideloading techniques and a compromised SharePoint server as a command and control center. The attack involved credential harvesting, use of web shells, and custom stealers to collect sensitive data. Notable TTPs included using hardcoded internal service names and proxy servers in malware, and exploiting a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication. The incident highlights the importance of comprehensive infrastructure monitoring and proper access controls.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The reported threat involves a targeted cyberespionage campaign conducted by the Chinese threat actor group APT41 against government IT services in Africa. APT41 is known for sophisticated, multi-stage attacks combining publicly available tools and custom malware to achieve persistence, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. In this campaign, the attackers leveraged a combination of Impacket (a Python toolkit for network protocol manipulation), Cobalt Strike (a commercial penetration testing tool often abused by threat actors), and custom-developed malware components. A key technique used was DLL sideloading, which involves placing a malicious DLL alongside a legitimate executable to bypass security controls and evade detection. The attackers also compromised a SharePoint server, repurposing it as a command and control (C2) infrastructure, enabling covert communication and control of infected hosts. The campaign included credential harvesting using tools like Mimikatz, deployment of web shells for persistent remote access, and custom stealers designed to exfiltrate sensitive data. Notably, the malware contained hardcoded internal service names and proxy server configurations, indicating a high level of reconnaissance and customization tailored to the victim environment. The use of a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication is a sophisticated tactic that blends malicious traffic with legitimate enterprise services, complicating detection efforts. This attack underscores the importance of comprehensive monitoring of infrastructure components, especially collaboration platforms like SharePoint, strict access control policies, and robust credential management to mitigate risks from advanced persistent threats.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly government entities and critical infrastructure providers, this threat highlights the risk posed by advanced persistent threat groups capable of leveraging trusted enterprise platforms such as SharePoint for command and control. Although the campaign is currently reported in Africa, similar tactics could be adapted against European targets due to the widespread use of Microsoft SharePoint and the prevalence of tools like Cobalt Strike in attacker toolkits. The potential impact includes unauthorized access to sensitive government data, disruption of IT services, and long-term espionage activities. Data exfiltration could compromise national security information and citizen data, while lateral movement and privilege escalation could allow attackers to establish persistent footholds, complicating incident response. The use of DLL sideloading and web shells can evade traditional endpoint detection mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of prolonged undetected presence. European organizations could face reputational damage, regulatory penalties under GDPR for data breaches, and operational disruptions if similar attacks occur.
Mitigation Recommendations
To mitigate this threat, European organizations should implement several targeted measures beyond generic advice: 1) Conduct thorough security audits and continuous monitoring of SharePoint and other collaboration platforms for unusual activity, including anomalous file uploads, unexpected DLL loads, and unusual outbound connections. 2) Employ application whitelisting and integrity verification to detect and prevent DLL sideloading attacks. 3) Harden credential management by enforcing multi-factor authentication, regularly rotating service and administrative credentials, and monitoring for credential dumping tools like Mimikatz. 4) Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement opportunities, especially isolating critical servers such as SharePoint from general user networks. 5) Utilize advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting Cobalt Strike behaviors and web shell activity. 6) Implement strict proxy and firewall rules to detect and block suspicious C2 traffic, including traffic masquerading as legitimate SharePoint communications. 7) Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise related to APT41 TTPs and maintain updated threat intelligence feeds. 8) Train IT and security staff to recognize signs of DLL sideloading and web shell deployment.
Affected Countries
France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Poland
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 100b463eff8295ba617d3ad6df5325c6
- hash: 125b257520d16d759b112399c3cd1466
- hash: 15097a32b515d10ad6d793d2d820f2a8
- hash: 27f506b198e7f5530c649b6e4860c958
- hash: 2cd15977b72d5d74fadedfde2ce8934f
- hash: 2f9d2d8c4f2c50cc4d2e156b9985e7ca
- hash: 3021c9bca4ef3aa672461ecadc4718e6
- hash: 3af014db9be1a04e8b312b55d4479f69
- hash: 4708a2ae3a5f008c87e68ed04a081f18
- hash: 740d6eb97329944d82317849f9bbd633
- hash: 91d10c25497cadb7249d47ae8ec94766
- hash: 9b00b6f93b70f09d8b35fa9a22b3cba1
- hash: 9b4f0f94133650b19474af6b5709e773
- hash: 9d53a0336acfb9e4df11162ccf7383a0
- hash: a052536e671c513221f788de2e62316c
- hash: a236dce873845ba4d3ccd8d5a4e1aefd
- hash: c149252a0a3b1f5724fd76f704a1e0af
- hash: c3ed337e2891736db6334a5f1d37dc0f
- hash: c7188c39b5c53ecbd3aec77a856ddf0c
- hash: f1025fcad036aad8bf124df8c9650bbc
- hash: 54ce0437b0946132041d4ffc34c6a7cae30829c1
- hash: a198565f40b1d9a60d26e691423793f883a7d888
- hash: bc9572e65e4dd4aaec37563a902e710c7504fa394a96437a77fd742ccfa28dc9
- hash: c8ffacb598ba8505b189b0e06906c78959d49839d4dc8ac201a3c9874f6af609
- ip: 38.175.195.13
- url: http://chyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun/aaa
- url: http://github.githubassets.net/okaqbfk867hmx2tvqxhc8zyq9fy694gf/hta
- url: http://toun.callback.red/aaa
- hash: 4e70b571f4c0cf51dfd31c5ed8cc58cd9cfa4d7f
- domain: azure.online
- domain: msn-microsoft.org
- domain: s3-azure.com
- domain: upload-microsoft.com
- domain: ap-northeast-1.s3-azure.com
- domain: chyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun
- domain: github.githubassets.net
- domain: ns1.s3-azure.com
- domain: ns2.s3-azure.com
- domain: toun.callback.red
- domain: www.msn-microsoft.org
- domain: www.upload-microsoft.com
SOC files: an APT41 attack on government IT services in Africa
Description
Chinese cyberespionage group APT41 conducted a targeted attack against government IT services in Africa. The attackers used various tools including Impacket, Cobalt Strike, and custom malware for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. They leveraged DLL sideloading techniques and a compromised SharePoint server as a command and control center. The attack involved credential harvesting, use of web shells, and custom stealers to collect sensitive data. Notable TTPs included using hardcoded internal service names and proxy servers in malware, and exploiting a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication. The incident highlights the importance of comprehensive infrastructure monitoring and proper access controls.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The reported threat involves a targeted cyberespionage campaign conducted by the Chinese threat actor group APT41 against government IT services in Africa. APT41 is known for sophisticated, multi-stage attacks combining publicly available tools and custom malware to achieve persistence, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. In this campaign, the attackers leveraged a combination of Impacket (a Python toolkit for network protocol manipulation), Cobalt Strike (a commercial penetration testing tool often abused by threat actors), and custom-developed malware components. A key technique used was DLL sideloading, which involves placing a malicious DLL alongside a legitimate executable to bypass security controls and evade detection. The attackers also compromised a SharePoint server, repurposing it as a command and control (C2) infrastructure, enabling covert communication and control of infected hosts. The campaign included credential harvesting using tools like Mimikatz, deployment of web shells for persistent remote access, and custom stealers designed to exfiltrate sensitive data. Notably, the malware contained hardcoded internal service names and proxy server configurations, indicating a high level of reconnaissance and customization tailored to the victim environment. The use of a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication is a sophisticated tactic that blends malicious traffic with legitimate enterprise services, complicating detection efforts. This attack underscores the importance of comprehensive monitoring of infrastructure components, especially collaboration platforms like SharePoint, strict access control policies, and robust credential management to mitigate risks from advanced persistent threats.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly government entities and critical infrastructure providers, this threat highlights the risk posed by advanced persistent threat groups capable of leveraging trusted enterprise platforms such as SharePoint for command and control. Although the campaign is currently reported in Africa, similar tactics could be adapted against European targets due to the widespread use of Microsoft SharePoint and the prevalence of tools like Cobalt Strike in attacker toolkits. The potential impact includes unauthorized access to sensitive government data, disruption of IT services, and long-term espionage activities. Data exfiltration could compromise national security information and citizen data, while lateral movement and privilege escalation could allow attackers to establish persistent footholds, complicating incident response. The use of DLL sideloading and web shells can evade traditional endpoint detection mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of prolonged undetected presence. European organizations could face reputational damage, regulatory penalties under GDPR for data breaches, and operational disruptions if similar attacks occur.
Mitigation Recommendations
To mitigate this threat, European organizations should implement several targeted measures beyond generic advice: 1) Conduct thorough security audits and continuous monitoring of SharePoint and other collaboration platforms for unusual activity, including anomalous file uploads, unexpected DLL loads, and unusual outbound connections. 2) Employ application whitelisting and integrity verification to detect and prevent DLL sideloading attacks. 3) Harden credential management by enforcing multi-factor authentication, regularly rotating service and administrative credentials, and monitoring for credential dumping tools like Mimikatz. 4) Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement opportunities, especially isolating critical servers such as SharePoint from general user networks. 5) Utilize advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting Cobalt Strike behaviors and web shell activity. 6) Implement strict proxy and firewall rules to detect and block suspicious C2 traffic, including traffic masquerading as legitimate SharePoint communications. 7) Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise related to APT41 TTPs and maintain updated threat intelligence feeds. 8) Train IT and security staff to recognize signs of DLL sideloading and web shell deployment.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://securelist.com/apt41-in-africa/116986/"]
- Adversary
- APT41
- Pulse Id
- 687e0dfc3d01c46d9a3c790b
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash100b463eff8295ba617d3ad6df5325c6 | — | |
hash125b257520d16d759b112399c3cd1466 | — | |
hash15097a32b515d10ad6d793d2d820f2a8 | — | |
hash27f506b198e7f5530c649b6e4860c958 | — | |
hash2cd15977b72d5d74fadedfde2ce8934f | — | |
hash2f9d2d8c4f2c50cc4d2e156b9985e7ca | — | |
hash3021c9bca4ef3aa672461ecadc4718e6 | — | |
hash3af014db9be1a04e8b312b55d4479f69 | — | |
hash4708a2ae3a5f008c87e68ed04a081f18 | — | |
hash740d6eb97329944d82317849f9bbd633 | — | |
hash91d10c25497cadb7249d47ae8ec94766 | — | |
hash9b00b6f93b70f09d8b35fa9a22b3cba1 | — | |
hash9b4f0f94133650b19474af6b5709e773 | — | |
hash9d53a0336acfb9e4df11162ccf7383a0 | — | |
hasha052536e671c513221f788de2e62316c | — | |
hasha236dce873845ba4d3ccd8d5a4e1aefd | — | |
hashc149252a0a3b1f5724fd76f704a1e0af | — | |
hashc3ed337e2891736db6334a5f1d37dc0f | — | |
hashc7188c39b5c53ecbd3aec77a856ddf0c | — | |
hashf1025fcad036aad8bf124df8c9650bbc | — | |
hash54ce0437b0946132041d4ffc34c6a7cae30829c1 | — | |
hasha198565f40b1d9a60d26e691423793f883a7d888 | — | |
hashbc9572e65e4dd4aaec37563a902e710c7504fa394a96437a77fd742ccfa28dc9 | — | |
hashc8ffacb598ba8505b189b0e06906c78959d49839d4dc8ac201a3c9874f6af609 | — | |
hash4e70b571f4c0cf51dfd31c5ed8cc58cd9cfa4d7f | — |
Ip
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
ip38.175.195.13 | — |
Url
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
urlhttp://chyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun/aaa | — | |
urlhttp://github.githubassets.net/okaqbfk867hmx2tvqxhc8zyq9fy694gf/hta | — | |
urlhttp://toun.callback.red/aaa | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainazure.online | — | |
domainmsn-microsoft.org | — | |
domains3-azure.com | — | |
domainupload-microsoft.com | — | |
domainap-northeast-1.s3-azure.com | — | |
domainchyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun | — | |
domaingithub.githubassets.net | — | |
domainns1.s3-azure.com | — | |
domainns2.s3-azure.com | — | |
domaintoun.callback.red | — | |
domainwww.msn-microsoft.org | — | |
domainwww.upload-microsoft.com | — |
Threat ID: 687e24f8a83201eaac0ebeb5
Added to database: 7/21/2025, 11:31:04 AM
Last enriched: 7/21/2025, 11:46:12 AM
Last updated: 7/23/2025, 2:45:02 AM
Views: 7
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