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SOC files: an APT41 attack on government IT services in Africa

Medium
Published: Mon Jul 21 2025 (07/21/2025, 09:53:00 UTC)
Source: AlienVault OTX General

Description

Chinese cyberespionage group APT41 conducted a targeted attack against government IT services in Africa. The attackers used various tools including Impacket, Cobalt Strike, and custom malware for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. They leveraged DLL sideloading techniques and a compromised SharePoint server as a command and control center. The attack involved credential harvesting, use of web shells, and custom stealers to collect sensitive data. Notable TTPs included using hardcoded internal service names and proxy servers in malware, and exploiting a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication. The incident highlights the importance of comprehensive infrastructure monitoring and proper access controls.

AI-Powered Analysis

AILast updated: 07/21/2025, 11:46:12 UTC

Technical Analysis

The reported threat involves a targeted cyberespionage campaign conducted by the Chinese threat actor group APT41 against government IT services in Africa. APT41 is known for sophisticated, multi-stage attacks combining publicly available tools and custom malware to achieve persistence, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration. In this campaign, the attackers leveraged a combination of Impacket (a Python toolkit for network protocol manipulation), Cobalt Strike (a commercial penetration testing tool often abused by threat actors), and custom-developed malware components. A key technique used was DLL sideloading, which involves placing a malicious DLL alongside a legitimate executable to bypass security controls and evade detection. The attackers also compromised a SharePoint server, repurposing it as a command and control (C2) infrastructure, enabling covert communication and control of infected hosts. The campaign included credential harvesting using tools like Mimikatz, deployment of web shells for persistent remote access, and custom stealers designed to exfiltrate sensitive data. Notably, the malware contained hardcoded internal service names and proxy server configurations, indicating a high level of reconnaissance and customization tailored to the victim environment. The use of a captive SharePoint server for C2 communication is a sophisticated tactic that blends malicious traffic with legitimate enterprise services, complicating detection efforts. This attack underscores the importance of comprehensive monitoring of infrastructure components, especially collaboration platforms like SharePoint, strict access control policies, and robust credential management to mitigate risks from advanced persistent threats.

Potential Impact

For European organizations, particularly government entities and critical infrastructure providers, this threat highlights the risk posed by advanced persistent threat groups capable of leveraging trusted enterprise platforms such as SharePoint for command and control. Although the campaign is currently reported in Africa, similar tactics could be adapted against European targets due to the widespread use of Microsoft SharePoint and the prevalence of tools like Cobalt Strike in attacker toolkits. The potential impact includes unauthorized access to sensitive government data, disruption of IT services, and long-term espionage activities. Data exfiltration could compromise national security information and citizen data, while lateral movement and privilege escalation could allow attackers to establish persistent footholds, complicating incident response. The use of DLL sideloading and web shells can evade traditional endpoint detection mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of prolonged undetected presence. European organizations could face reputational damage, regulatory penalties under GDPR for data breaches, and operational disruptions if similar attacks occur.

Mitigation Recommendations

To mitigate this threat, European organizations should implement several targeted measures beyond generic advice: 1) Conduct thorough security audits and continuous monitoring of SharePoint and other collaboration platforms for unusual activity, including anomalous file uploads, unexpected DLL loads, and unusual outbound connections. 2) Employ application whitelisting and integrity verification to detect and prevent DLL sideloading attacks. 3) Harden credential management by enforcing multi-factor authentication, regularly rotating service and administrative credentials, and monitoring for credential dumping tools like Mimikatz. 4) Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement opportunities, especially isolating critical servers such as SharePoint from general user networks. 5) Utilize advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting Cobalt Strike behaviors and web shell activity. 6) Implement strict proxy and firewall rules to detect and block suspicious C2 traffic, including traffic masquerading as legitimate SharePoint communications. 7) Conduct regular threat hunting exercises focusing on indicators of compromise related to APT41 TTPs and maintain updated threat intelligence feeds. 8) Train IT and security staff to recognize signs of DLL sideloading and web shell deployment.

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Technical Details

Author
AlienVault
Tlp
white
References
["https://securelist.com/apt41-in-africa/116986/"]
Adversary
APT41
Pulse Id
687e0dfc3d01c46d9a3c790b
Threat Score
null

Indicators of Compromise

Hash

ValueDescriptionCopy
hash100b463eff8295ba617d3ad6df5325c6
hash125b257520d16d759b112399c3cd1466
hash15097a32b515d10ad6d793d2d820f2a8
hash27f506b198e7f5530c649b6e4860c958
hash2cd15977b72d5d74fadedfde2ce8934f
hash2f9d2d8c4f2c50cc4d2e156b9985e7ca
hash3021c9bca4ef3aa672461ecadc4718e6
hash3af014db9be1a04e8b312b55d4479f69
hash4708a2ae3a5f008c87e68ed04a081f18
hash740d6eb97329944d82317849f9bbd633
hash91d10c25497cadb7249d47ae8ec94766
hash9b00b6f93b70f09d8b35fa9a22b3cba1
hash9b4f0f94133650b19474af6b5709e773
hash9d53a0336acfb9e4df11162ccf7383a0
hasha052536e671c513221f788de2e62316c
hasha236dce873845ba4d3ccd8d5a4e1aefd
hashc149252a0a3b1f5724fd76f704a1e0af
hashc3ed337e2891736db6334a5f1d37dc0f
hashc7188c39b5c53ecbd3aec77a856ddf0c
hashf1025fcad036aad8bf124df8c9650bbc
hash54ce0437b0946132041d4ffc34c6a7cae30829c1
hasha198565f40b1d9a60d26e691423793f883a7d888
hashbc9572e65e4dd4aaec37563a902e710c7504fa394a96437a77fd742ccfa28dc9
hashc8ffacb598ba8505b189b0e06906c78959d49839d4dc8ac201a3c9874f6af609
hash4e70b571f4c0cf51dfd31c5ed8cc58cd9cfa4d7f

Ip

ValueDescriptionCopy
ip38.175.195.13

Url

ValueDescriptionCopy
urlhttp://chyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun/aaa
urlhttp://github.githubassets.net/okaqbfk867hmx2tvqxhc8zyq9fy694gf/hta
urlhttp://toun.callback.red/aaa

Domain

ValueDescriptionCopy
domainazure.online
domainmsn-microsoft.org
domains3-azure.com
domainupload-microsoft.com
domainap-northeast-1.s3-azure.com
domainchyedweeyaxkavyccenwjvqrsgvyj0o1y.oast.fun
domaingithub.githubassets.net
domainns1.s3-azure.com
domainns2.s3-azure.com
domaintoun.callback.red
domainwww.msn-microsoft.org
domainwww.upload-microsoft.com

Threat ID: 687e24f8a83201eaac0ebeb5

Added to database: 7/21/2025, 11:31:04 AM

Last enriched: 7/21/2025, 11:46:12 AM

Last updated: 7/23/2025, 2:45:02 AM

Views: 7

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