CVE-2025-30192: PowerDNS Recursor · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Affects PowerDNS RecursorSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 19% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 21 Jul 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
AI-suggested
European organizations should implement the following specific mitigations: 1) Upgrade PowerDNS Recursor to the latest version that includes the ECS spoofing mitigations. 2) Enable the outgoing.edns_subnet_harden setting to enforce the strictest validation of ECS-enabled queries, significantly reducing spoofing risk. 3) Review and audit DNS resolver configurations to ensure ECS is enabled only where necessary, minimizing the attack surface. 4) Implement network-level protections such as DNS response validation, DNSSEC validation where applicable, and rate limiting to detect and mitigate spoofed or anomalous DNS traffic. 5) Monitor DNS traffic logs for unusual patterns indicative of spoofing attempts or DNS anomalies. 6) Coordinate with upstream DNS providers and peers to ensure consistent ECS handling and validation. 7) Prepare incident response plans specific to DNS service disruptions to minimize downtime in case of exploitation. These measures go beyond generic advice by focusing on ECS-specific configurations and operational monitoring tailored to this vulnerability.
Description
An attacker spoofing answers to ECS enabled requests sent out by the Recursor has a chance of success higher than non-ECS enabled queries. The updated version include various mitigations against spoofing attempts of ECS enabled queries by chaining ECS enabled requests and enforcing stricter validation of the received answers. The most strict mitigation done when the new setting outgoing.edns_subnet_harden (old style name edns-subnet-harden) is enabled.