memories-core-web

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (5aa2bc32ff519468287f8a87deeff1349332b710735b9f78ee34ffd46c9511cb)
package.json declares a `preinstall` lifecycle script that runs `curl` to a hardcoded webhook.site collector URL (https://webhook.site/b2967b0a-1b24-4670-8ae1-e09e3cf272c4/) with the installer's hostname and username interpolated as query parameters via `$(hostname)` and `$(whoami)`. This fires automatically on `npm install` and transmits installer host identifiers to a third-party collector controlled by whoever provisioned the webhook.site endpoint. The destination is a generic request-capture service, not infrastructure associated with any declared publisher, and the data flow is unconditional on install.

GCVE Database

Malicious code in memories-core-web (npm)

rs-lookout-sandbox-poc

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (4f28ed1c404dad5afc7b70b345eeef6f81e04dcee77be3a7553956c7a43f8e7c)
On module load, index.js reads os.userInfo().username and issues an HTTPS GET to a hardcoded third-party collector at https://webhook.site/553dad0e-c841-46a8-b07d-213b52a24686/, transmitting the installer's local username to an anonymous external endpoint. The same top-level code performs AWS Instance Metadata Service reconnaissance against 169.254.169.254: it PUTs /latest/api/token to obtain an IMDSv2 session token and then GETs /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ to enumerate the IAM role attached to the host. Both behaviors fire automatically when the package is required, with no caller action.

Malicious code in rs-lookout-sandbox-poc (npm)

@securihackbot/depconf-stage-1792484738

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d8d8706d2a75c053047537a4f57f754a572a1ca4cec4cde80d00e453878013e1)
The package's npm postinstall hook automatically executes on install and transmits installer-identifying data to a hardcoded remote endpoint. It collects os.hostname(), the local username, platform/arch, Node version, package name, and a nonce, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it as a `d=` query parameter via plain-HTTP GET to http://34.143.131.27:18080/x-VA-1/main.js (overridable only via a DEPCONF_CALLBACK_URL env var that defaults to this hardcoded bare IP). A DNS beacon fallback to a configurable collaborator suffix is also issued. The package name (`@securihackbot/depconf-stage-...`) and bundled configure.sh workflow are structured to be re-published under victim-internal scopes so that `npm install` of an internal package name resolves to this artifact from the public registry, at which point the postinstall beacon fires and leaks the host, user, and internal package name back to the operator — a dependency-confusion attack payload against any environment that resolves it.

Malicious code in @securihackbot/depconf-stage-1792484738 (npm)

rootaccessxvv-bbmarker

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (126c6e67bc80ed62f5e620ef9a8ce11ca39653348a59bc8d7a1d0cef76f72a02)
package.json declares a postinstall lifecycle script that runs on `npm install` and POSTs installer host identifiers to a hardcoded webhook.site collector at https://webhook.site/8f9e5268-4fcf-47a1-97a8-681b51c1edbc/rce-proof. The script shells out to `whoami`, `hostname`, `uname`, and `node -v`, concatenates the output with the current working directory, and sends the result via `curl -X POST`. The destination is an anonymous third-party webhook aggregator unrelated to any legitimate install-time dependency. The package name self-describes as a proof-of-concept, but the behavior — automatic install-time collection and exfiltration of installer identity and host metadata to an attacker-controlled collector — is a working supply-chain attack regardless of how it is labeled.

Malicious code in rootaccessxvv-bbmarker (npm)

8i7pp4

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_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (c623f39e0d4b0b51a05de329eccc8daa9ea567d83dc8365f3523462b2bd08b09)
Package 8i7pp4 version 0.0.0-stage contains only two files and no detected behaviors of concern. There are no lifecycle scripts fetching or executing remote content, no reads of installer secrets (environment variables, SSH/AWS/npm credentials, browser or wallet stores), no outbound network calls to attacker-controlled destinations, no obfuscated payloads, and no persistence or backdoor mechanisms. The version suffix and minimal file count are consistent with a placeholder, staging, or test publication rather than functional code.

## Source: ghsa-malware (8dc37ece0db632118d074f0d0a549b4dba2ccd639a3a01c7b0b682bae81b1fc0)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Malicious code in 8i7pp4 (npm)

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability exists in the SNS enrollment Portal.



Through the captive portal an attacker can inject an XSS when requesting certificate creation for user. The stored XSS can only be triggered during validation by the administrator.

A Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability exists in the SNS enrollment Portal. (CVE-2026-113810)

Description

CVSS v3.1

Weaknesses

Technical Details

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