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CVE-2026-111115VulnerabilityPublished Updated

Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender

Affects kafkaSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-111115· Critical 9.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.

Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 15:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CISA-ADPCVSS 3.19.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 28 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Ubuntu Pro 18.04 LTSkafkapkg:deb/ubuntu/kafka?arch=source&distro=esm-apps/bionicOther threatsAffected
  • =2.2.0u2-0ubuntu3.1
  • =2.2.0u2-0ubuntu3.2
  • =2.2.2u1-0ubuntu1+esm2
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0, size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to the request header itself. Impact: The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3), the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL or quota is required. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before any per-field allocation.

References

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