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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-41425: Authlib · Cross-site request forging when using cache

Affects mcpmSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.4 Medium : upgrade to 2.14.0_3 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.4Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 1% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.14.0_3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 13 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade mcpm to 2.14.0_3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Homebrewmcpmpkg:brew/mcpmOther threatsAffected
  • >=2.1.0 <2.14.0_3
Fixed in
  • 2.14.0_3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary There is no CSRF protection on the cache feature on most integrations clients. ### Details In `authlib.integrations.starlette_client.OAuth`, no CSRF protection is set up when using the cache parameter. When _not_ using the cache parameter, the use of SessionMiddleware ties the client to the auth state, preventing CSRF attacks. With the cache, there is no such mechanism. Other integratons have the same issue, it's not just starlette. The state parameter is taken from the callback URL and the state is fetched from the cache without checking that it is the same client calling the redirect endpoint as was the one that initiated the auth flow. This issue is documented in RFC 6749 section 10.12: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-10.12 ### PoC - Set up a Starlette integration with a cache - The attacker starts the auth flow up until before the callback URL is followed. - The attacked sends the redirect URL to the victim - The victim now completes the authorisation ### Impact This impacts all users that use the cache to store auth state. All users will be vulnerable to CSRF attacks and may have an attacker's account tied to their own.

References

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