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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-9098: github.com/casdoor/casdoor · Casdoor SAML callback handler accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest

Affects github.com/casdoor/casdoorSource GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.

Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 13% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 28 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Gogithub.com/casdoor/casdoorAffected
  • <=1.1000.1-0.20260321120606-239e8bd69487
Fixed in–

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AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, administrators should carefully manage and monitor registered IdPs, avoiding disabling or deleting IdPs during active SAML flows. Consider restricting or auditing upstream IdPs to trusted entities only. Monitor for unusual SAML responses and session creations related to /api/acs.

Description

In Casdoor versions 2.362.0 and earlier, the SAML callback handler in controllers/auth.go accepts any well-formed SAMLResponse sent to /api/acs without verifying that it corresponds to an AuthnRequest previously issued by Casdoor. Additionally, if an administrator disables or deletes an IdP (Identity Provider) after a SAML flow has started, the handler still processes the response using the provider snapshot loaded at the start of the request. As a result, an attacker controlling a registered upstream IdP can send unsolicited SAML responses, or replay a legitimately captured response in a different session or after the original flow has ended. In both cases, Casdoor accepts the response and issues a session, enabling persistent unauthorized access.

References

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