CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 contains a time-of-check time-of-use vulnerability because
Source GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High.
Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 16:22 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 4.0 | 7.0 |
|---|---|---|
| CNA (VulnCheck) | CVSS 3.1 | 5.7 |
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| CCC-Attestationattested-tls-poc | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubattested-tls-pocpkg:github/attested-tls-pocOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, limit local access to attesting endpoints and monitor for unauthorized changes to workload code, configuration, and attached devices. Consider architectural changes to support post-handshake re-attestation to mitigate this TOCTOU vulnerability.
Description
The CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc project contains a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability in its attestation process. The vulnerability arises because evidence is only appraised once during the TLS handshake, with no re-attestation after the handshake completes. This allows attackers with local access to the attesting endpoint to modify workload code, data, configuration, or attached devices such as GPUs, while peers continue to trust the original attestation evidence.
References
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129092 (opens in a new tab)
- doi.org/10.1145/3779208.3785387 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/CCC-Attestation/attested-tls-poc (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/CCC-Attestation/formal-spec-id-crisis (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ionut-arm/mbedtls/blob/f4ac7593826a506fc509c83cad73786acab1d442/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/ccc-attestation-sig-attested-tls-poc-through-commit-731ca82-toctou-via-handshake-only-attestation (opens in a new tab)