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CVE-2026-129092VulnerabilityPublished

CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc through commit 731ca82 contains a time-of-check time-of-use vulnerability because

Source GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-129092· High 7.0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High.

Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 16:22 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.0High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 4.07.0
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 3.15.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 13 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
CCC-Attestationattested-tls-pocAffected
  • =0
Fixed in–
GitHubattested-tls-pocpkg:github/attested-tls-pocOther threatsAffected
  • =0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, limit local access to attesting endpoints and monitor for unauthorized changes to workload code, configuration, and attached devices. Consider architectural changes to support post-handshake re-attestation to mitigate this TOCTOU vulnerability.

Description

The CCC Attestation SIG attested-tls-poc project contains a time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) vulnerability in its attestation process. The vulnerability arises because evidence is only appraised once during the TLS handshake, with no re-attestation after the handshake completes. This allows attackers with local access to the attesting endpoint to modify workload code, data, configuration, or attached devices such as GPUs, while peers continue to trust the original attestation evidence.

References

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