[CERT-FR] Sandworm intrusion set campaign targeting Centreon systems
Affects cert-ist enrichedSource CIRCL OSINT Feed
0
TLP:WHITE, disclosure is not limited
Description
CERT-FR reports a campaign by the Sandworm intrusion set targeting Centreon systems primarily in Western Europe. The campaign exploits public-facing Linux applications to perform file discovery, deploy web shells, modify system processes, and exfiltrate data via command and control channels. Multiple threat actors including Iridium, Telebots, Sandworm, and Electrum are involved. The overall threat level is assessed as low by CERT-IST, with medium severity noted in the report. No patches are currently available for this threat.
Indicators of compromise
Hashes 12
Comment 9
- Backdoors related to Sandworm
- These IOCs come from an ANSSI report (CERTFR-2021-CTI-004) published on February 15, 2021, which document a campaign of system compromises that impacted several French entities. This campaign targeted the Centreon IT monitoring software. The first compromises identified by the ANSSI date back from the end of 2017 and the attacks have continued until 2020. They mainly affected IT service providers, particularly web hosting providers. On the compromised systems, the webshell P.A.S. (alias Fobushell) is deployed in the Centreon web folder. Its content remains encrypted until the attacker connects to it and enters the right password. In several cases, this webshell has been used to deploy the Exaramel backdoor. This malware written in Go language is also deployed in the Centreon directory and its persistence is ensured via a scheduled task (Cron). The initial vector of this attack campaign is not precisely known. It can simply be assumed that it involves the exploitation of a vulnerability or a weakness in the Centreon monitoring software. The analyses allowed to identify two categories of infrastructure used in these attacks: Anonymization infrastructure: attackers use Tor or VPN services to connect to the webshells, Command and control infrastructure: Attackers use dedicated servers to manage the implants. Note: Exaramel communicates with its command and control servers via HTTPS. WARNING: the ANSSI does not attribute these attacks to the Sandworm group (alias Telebots) and therefore even less to a Russian intelligence unit. The similarities observed relate to the modus operandi implemented: in particular the Exaramel backdoor and infrastructure elements. In reality, these elements of similarity even seem rather weak, at least on the sole reading of the ANSSI report.Cert-IST Description
- ExaramelCert-IST Malware Name
- FobushellCert-IST Malware Name
- PASCert-IST Malware Name
- P.A.S.Cert-IST Malware Name
- Sandworm TeamCert-IST Attack Alias
- ELECTRUMCert-IST Attack Alias
- BlackEnergyCert-IST Attack Alias
Text 1
Cert-IST Attack name
- TeleBots
Link 1
Cert-IST External link
- https://wws.cert-ist.com/private/fr/IocAttack_details?format=html&objectType=ATK&ref=CERT-IST/ATK-2016-066
File 7
- /tmp/.applocktxSocket created by Exaramel
- /tmp/.applockSocket created by Exaramel
- configtx.jsonExaramel configuration file
- centreon_module_linux_app64
- search.php
- DB-Drop.php
- /bin/backup
Target location 1
Cert-IST Targeted Country
- France
Datetime 2
- 2021-01-26T23:00:00+00:00Cert-IST First Disclosed Date
- 2017-10-31T23:00:00+00:00Cert-IST First Seen Date
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