How a new PlugX variant abuses DLL search order hijacking
A new campaign targeting telecommunications and manufacturing sectors in Central and South Asian countries has been discovered, delivering a new variant of PlugX. The campaign, active since 2022, shows overlaps between RainyDay and Turian backdoors, including the abuse of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading and shared encryption methods. The new PlugX variant's configuration format resembles that of RainyDay, suggesting attribution to Naikon. Analysis of victimology and technical implementation indicates a potential connection between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy, possibly sourcing tools from the same vendor. The malware families use similar infection chains, loaders, and shellcode structures, with shared RC4 keys for payload decryption. This campaign highlights the evolving tactics of Chinese-speaking threat actors and the potential collaboration between previously distinct groups.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The analyzed threat involves a newly identified variant of the PlugX malware family, actively deployed since 2022 in targeted campaigns against telecommunications and manufacturing sectors primarily in Central and South Asia. This variant leverages DLL search order hijacking, a technique where malicious DLLs are loaded by abusing the order in which Windows searches for DLLs, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code under the guise of legitimate applications. The campaign exhibits overlaps with other malware families such as RainyDay and Turian, sharing infection chains, loaders, shellcode structures, and even encryption keys (notably RC4 keys) for payload decryption. The configuration format of this PlugX variant closely resembles that of RainyDay, suggesting a common origin or shared development resources, attributed to the Naikon threat actor group. Furthermore, analysis indicates a potential operational link between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy, possibly indicating collaboration or shared tooling from a common vendor. The campaign’s tactics reflect an evolution in Chinese-speaking threat actors’ methodologies, combining DLL sideloading with sophisticated backdoor deployment to maintain persistence and evade detection. The use of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading complicates detection efforts, as it blends malicious activity with normal system processes. The campaign employs multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques, including DLL search order hijacking (T1574.001), code injection (T1055), credential dumping (T1003), and lateral movement (T1021.002), underscoring a multi-faceted attack chain designed for stealth and persistence. While no known exploits in the wild are reported, the campaign’s longevity and complexity highlight a mature threat actor infrastructure.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly those in telecommunications and manufacturing sectors, this threat poses significant risks. If the malware were to spread or be adapted to target European entities, it could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, espionage, and disruption of critical infrastructure operations. The abuse of DLL search order hijacking complicates detection and mitigation, potentially allowing attackers to maintain long-term persistence within networks. Given the shared encryption keys and modular payloads, attackers could customize the malware to evade existing defenses. The compromise of telecommunications infrastructure could impact data confidentiality and availability, affecting communication services vital for business and government operations. Manufacturing sector infections could disrupt production lines, leading to financial losses and supply chain interruptions. Additionally, the potential link between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy suggests a broader espionage campaign that could target sensitive governmental or industrial information within Europe. Although the campaign is currently focused on Central and South Asia, the tactics and malware families involved have global relevance and could be repurposed against European targets, especially given geopolitical tensions and the strategic importance of these sectors.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted defenses against DLL search order hijacking by enforcing strict application whitelisting and employing tools that monitor and validate DLL loads, such as Microsoft’s Sysinternals Process Monitor and Application Control policies. Regularly auditing and restricting the execution of unsigned or suspicious DLLs can reduce risk. Network segmentation and strict access controls should be enforced to limit lateral movement opportunities. Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions should be tuned to detect behaviors indicative of code injection, shellcode execution, and unusual process spawning associated with PlugX and related malware. Organizations should also deploy threat hunting activities focused on indicators of compromise related to RainyDay, Turian, and PlugX, including monitoring for shared RC4 key usage patterns. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) and credential hygiene are critical to prevent credential dumping and reuse. Given the malware’s use of legitimate applications for sideloading, maintaining an up-to-date inventory of authorized software and monitoring for anomalous DLL loads is essential. Incident response plans should include procedures for isolating infected systems and eradicating persistent backdoors. Collaboration with national cybersecurity agencies and sharing threat intelligence related to these malware families can enhance collective defense.
Affected Countries
Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Poland, Netherlands
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 1644f0fc35546b1863a314a090b37cfd
- hash: 37df2da57f726aa5e044963610ac66ab
- hash: 421320ccf8972de50f8574a5b1c8d308
- hash: 4828bbea12517a16c4790e30b10570ea
- hash: 4ed171a64cae819b224aa3e2bc844219
- hash: 547caf34217c17358783c5ab48681f9f
- hash: 637525e6eaeabd2998dc10c14a67e940
- hash: 7104f3dd3738b04df0bc6993045f3b21
- hash: 84649f22ccde1dad34016117a7b296e5
- hash: 982659f15f45efcd699d26069f7e3e05
- hash: aa4e5f8a00e4ab5af551c7e1f53da2ff
- hash: bfb0255751fcff41670d97520d4354fb
- hash: de5baeb185484e99c83b46988a6002a4
- hash: e819778c1655f65582bf3f426f112b72
- hash: f3ac847b3465cba107c947a7f72f5aa2
- hash: f6930322bf6cb1b85a61126ccf17a2b9
- hash: fd9e7d100cdf72d6f8e93e0c04d764a1
- hash: 040328541d1c8c29fb11d5ca6ad2efd1593b00f2
- hash: 071581b2092f8eec9e3fe3bec10c44284d191f93
- hash: 282353f2a49b02a6aa89140d5a4fa13a1340119f
- hash: 388627cd6b66a7714af6c6d416ac6a5ff6690cf1
- hash: 4e08a2615d13bc21be04b6c2d4ce20798f2b1f04
- hash: 58efa253735c5fff7d24fb705f7b63d986208518
- hash: 606b1c3bb432e50ef6ee94bdfbcca4ce5cf9617d
- hash: 764f44e6673bf073264ddf6ec09ef1db7e9bdedb
- hash: 84e5e85926145461e1eca6e698336df27b9bf63a
- hash: a10583689711c4de8667a7300d0e8f0c7bcb78a3
- hash: a95943205d4296f9a393c5dbc110f532393487ba
- hash: bc7bf6fd94afd80116ae4d004c273883049a867a
- hash: bd45ab53d77d0252b5b0934e5ac90319243908d0
- hash: bf211e08d0c327c67c4e658d0bca26ac6c308f4d
- hash: c068b3700b81e5b11194ba6f976e2a5731522598
- hash: c35d55de271a3ff3222bb46f5d27039e0a8e24a0
- hash: d258d0102834c47e133002b212d5ea12ed4bac20
- hash: d2fffbe63b70a5993cb6fb035a2f665c7fa92a75
- hash: d91337af047c8b4f26e40ce8187910daf2d19a7d
- hash: 00dbc8a4b3121af5a19504a9d969e36e709556420a6117eb3533f1d2a8100fd9
- hash: 03cec3b010853893310fea486ecfddf09642a7a5c695c70db77d22bc7c402234
- hash: 0443289b1fc556c5ef4bbfa13774500e3936d965799a9c27be0601170601094d
- hash: 0bc51a290919c52cc62b3d8b4eed96609edf264f742d0409c975553b0cdc84a8
- hash: 0ec83d1deb6065cac8ba8f849cdf5672da7313ec2e860a7d71bb7e397e661394
- hash: 10479191f2e06ff11797fc4dda2e38ae6667c9dc396fac32a6cf76965358ade6
- hash: 1357b4577bd2d99546df2ef5cb4cd3bcbe2a9ee91783eb6798fc7dea660bc5e5
- hash: 262df5a17003b3dc06d6eb2fff89eb66709819df8219f2842bfc913be9f85c10
- hash: 2755de59ef87f9f38c236ed860a1f6f41a1d864126f54c4c0a7f87d4b4f63b20
- hash: 2cc9959ff1172366e71c8ed89be5cb23f17abce1125871fe47a9465f59e6ed17
- hash: 3480613294bc1e1704616dbf5628b92d7186246b87dbef1c8c3dbae13fe35c8b
- hash: 419eabb1c4c9be3ebdd726c73c497dcd2e39245f7e72ffcb67e032fcefe5ba13
- hash: 42c9505c2c55b80e0e311cd6da6a5263b946c8ae8bd8162b0280a1e9be7f174b
- hash: 4c2253777f1b6e54431c28a7a284577bda3464aa82837bbd7de57a00869f0c5b
- hash: 6a7880e14b9f03fe281c28b93094b7b150a1360cbf64dd0b47c87e111db406ca
- hash: 7b028a9bd2bc0c306ab6561cf702406f5925fc073f9d0d2d9408ceccd6907743
- hash: 906ff72d4ea9cd831c58dc009fb1bbe407e8f430208a63d3dffd3f8e1da73f6e
- hash: a12ed375965859d9434c9f651eef2f3663bb076963fec31723176c9083117671
- hash: a92ed5f831c99bb84208ef7d7c733e0183a79de40f9d3b3be54744951f0a1391
- hash: ab526d5ed335860ac2fe0adee26de1a95a3c528299800ddbb4d1e2dd91267252
- hash: aec2d0cbd2f195bf35e55019a29f0d6109451eb85dc7941b73e3b562b065a11c
- hash: b03fe49036c3830f149135068ff54f5c6c6622008a6fcb7edbf6b352e9a0acc0
- hash: b1ee96026a3fc0ee55dab3b73896e88760f909b3c52d4a0152288d90e63f2e63
- hash: b691b2c1846ea75bb5b07a21c8664ecdb6379685623ba45fe6ca552e94a58ebc
- hash: c91595edd1c9a0a2c1168e3bfa532e4a7dbb6b1380afd80ba445b728622798a4
- hash: c922ef32c4ab94f8b870c62883f3e41755ec705db76ec4efb0d343458f1e28c7
- hash: def64a0564f33f39235e3778d86863565a40493ae1f5c075552611d79383b471
- hash: dff0164392e12d2bbb85c630419fd349f9d87f80bdb92774c0b53d7e063e77e4
- hash: e29767ffb75be9f363a39ba9b66785ecfc992e3d91ec9fc46515ef94c37dc0b6
- hash: f0397688418692c467488ac37d362b9b1efdba8b60b0d99725e2b66f3e03badb
- hash: f0ad27f8737ac1a079a52c91d8b5cdd554cd42dccc597de8337e0c25d5287dd2
- hash: f3abb0cc802f3d7b95fc8762b94bdcb13bf39634c40c357301c4aa1d67a256fb
- hash: fd6b1ca0f26e54fa9c97ea15c834e58ffb71798df38071ad00b14f19d6a4126c
- hash: fd87149d6b8fdcad5d84ba4a3ca52e1cef8f0c54cafca6dbbb5d156f313d79dd
- hash: fe4f88bdfff87a94bd57bc16c20d199ee548e551b4aca852bcc013d0955d7ce8
- ip: 103.136.45.108
- ip: 103.172.10.165
- ip: 103.9.14.218
- ip: 117.239.199.202
- ip: 117.254.105.200
- ip: 123.181.24.36
- ip: 138.112.25.25
- ip: 141.164.59.111
- ip: 23.254.225.184
- ip: 36.75.75.75
- ip: 45.114.192.137
- ip: 66.42.62.253
- ip: 71.162.181.51
- domain: 2fgithub.com
- domain: newsinfom.org
- domain: asp.asphspes.com
- domain: mailserver.kozow.com
- domain: pay.googleinstall.com
How a new PlugX variant abuses DLL search order hijacking
Description
A new campaign targeting telecommunications and manufacturing sectors in Central and South Asian countries has been discovered, delivering a new variant of PlugX. The campaign, active since 2022, shows overlaps between RainyDay and Turian backdoors, including the abuse of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading and shared encryption methods. The new PlugX variant's configuration format resembles that of RainyDay, suggesting attribution to Naikon. Analysis of victimology and technical implementation indicates a potential connection between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy, possibly sourcing tools from the same vendor. The malware families use similar infection chains, loaders, and shellcode structures, with shared RC4 keys for payload decryption. This campaign highlights the evolving tactics of Chinese-speaking threat actors and the potential collaboration between previously distinct groups.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The analyzed threat involves a newly identified variant of the PlugX malware family, actively deployed since 2022 in targeted campaigns against telecommunications and manufacturing sectors primarily in Central and South Asia. This variant leverages DLL search order hijacking, a technique where malicious DLLs are loaded by abusing the order in which Windows searches for DLLs, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code under the guise of legitimate applications. The campaign exhibits overlaps with other malware families such as RainyDay and Turian, sharing infection chains, loaders, shellcode structures, and even encryption keys (notably RC4 keys) for payload decryption. The configuration format of this PlugX variant closely resembles that of RainyDay, suggesting a common origin or shared development resources, attributed to the Naikon threat actor group. Furthermore, analysis indicates a potential operational link between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy, possibly indicating collaboration or shared tooling from a common vendor. The campaign’s tactics reflect an evolution in Chinese-speaking threat actors’ methodologies, combining DLL sideloading with sophisticated backdoor deployment to maintain persistence and evade detection. The use of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading complicates detection efforts, as it blends malicious activity with normal system processes. The campaign employs multiple MITRE ATT&CK techniques, including DLL search order hijacking (T1574.001), code injection (T1055), credential dumping (T1003), and lateral movement (T1021.002), underscoring a multi-faceted attack chain designed for stealth and persistence. While no known exploits in the wild are reported, the campaign’s longevity and complexity highlight a mature threat actor infrastructure.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, particularly those in telecommunications and manufacturing sectors, this threat poses significant risks. If the malware were to spread or be adapted to target European entities, it could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, espionage, and disruption of critical infrastructure operations. The abuse of DLL search order hijacking complicates detection and mitigation, potentially allowing attackers to maintain long-term persistence within networks. Given the shared encryption keys and modular payloads, attackers could customize the malware to evade existing defenses. The compromise of telecommunications infrastructure could impact data confidentiality and availability, affecting communication services vital for business and government operations. Manufacturing sector infections could disrupt production lines, leading to financial losses and supply chain interruptions. Additionally, the potential link between Naikon and BackdoorDiplomacy suggests a broader espionage campaign that could target sensitive governmental or industrial information within Europe. Although the campaign is currently focused on Central and South Asia, the tactics and malware families involved have global relevance and could be repurposed against European targets, especially given geopolitical tensions and the strategic importance of these sectors.
Mitigation Recommendations
European organizations should implement targeted defenses against DLL search order hijacking by enforcing strict application whitelisting and employing tools that monitor and validate DLL loads, such as Microsoft’s Sysinternals Process Monitor and Application Control policies. Regularly auditing and restricting the execution of unsigned or suspicious DLLs can reduce risk. Network segmentation and strict access controls should be enforced to limit lateral movement opportunities. Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions should be tuned to detect behaviors indicative of code injection, shellcode execution, and unusual process spawning associated with PlugX and related malware. Organizations should also deploy threat hunting activities focused on indicators of compromise related to RainyDay, Turian, and PlugX, including monitoring for shared RC4 key usage patterns. Multi-factor authentication (MFA) and credential hygiene are critical to prevent credential dumping and reuse. Given the malware’s use of legitimate applications for sideloading, maintaining an up-to-date inventory of authorized software and monitoring for anomalous DLL loads is essential. Incident response plans should include procedures for isolating infected systems and eradicating persistent backdoors. Collaboration with national cybersecurity agencies and sharing threat intelligence related to these malware families can enhance collective defense.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/blob/main/2025/09/how-rainyday-turian-and-a-new-plugx-variant-abuse-dll-search-order-hijacking.txt","https://blog.talosintelligence.com/how-rainyday-turian-and-a-new-plugx-variant-abuse-dll-search-order-hijacking/"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 68d594c5084d2279312e988e
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
hash1644f0fc35546b1863a314a090b37cfd | — | |
hash37df2da57f726aa5e044963610ac66ab | — | |
hash421320ccf8972de50f8574a5b1c8d308 | — | |
hash4828bbea12517a16c4790e30b10570ea | — | |
hash4ed171a64cae819b224aa3e2bc844219 | — | |
hash547caf34217c17358783c5ab48681f9f | — | |
hash637525e6eaeabd2998dc10c14a67e940 | — | |
hash7104f3dd3738b04df0bc6993045f3b21 | — | |
hash84649f22ccde1dad34016117a7b296e5 | — | |
hash982659f15f45efcd699d26069f7e3e05 | — | |
hashaa4e5f8a00e4ab5af551c7e1f53da2ff | — | |
hashbfb0255751fcff41670d97520d4354fb | — | |
hashde5baeb185484e99c83b46988a6002a4 | — | |
hashe819778c1655f65582bf3f426f112b72 | — | |
hashf3ac847b3465cba107c947a7f72f5aa2 | — | |
hashf6930322bf6cb1b85a61126ccf17a2b9 | — | |
hashfd9e7d100cdf72d6f8e93e0c04d764a1 | — | |
hash040328541d1c8c29fb11d5ca6ad2efd1593b00f2 | — | |
hash071581b2092f8eec9e3fe3bec10c44284d191f93 | — | |
hash282353f2a49b02a6aa89140d5a4fa13a1340119f | — | |
hash388627cd6b66a7714af6c6d416ac6a5ff6690cf1 | — | |
hash4e08a2615d13bc21be04b6c2d4ce20798f2b1f04 | — | |
hash58efa253735c5fff7d24fb705f7b63d986208518 | — | |
hash606b1c3bb432e50ef6ee94bdfbcca4ce5cf9617d | — | |
hash764f44e6673bf073264ddf6ec09ef1db7e9bdedb | — | |
hash84e5e85926145461e1eca6e698336df27b9bf63a | — | |
hasha10583689711c4de8667a7300d0e8f0c7bcb78a3 | — | |
hasha95943205d4296f9a393c5dbc110f532393487ba | — | |
hashbc7bf6fd94afd80116ae4d004c273883049a867a | — | |
hashbd45ab53d77d0252b5b0934e5ac90319243908d0 | — | |
hashbf211e08d0c327c67c4e658d0bca26ac6c308f4d | — | |
hashc068b3700b81e5b11194ba6f976e2a5731522598 | — | |
hashc35d55de271a3ff3222bb46f5d27039e0a8e24a0 | — | |
hashd258d0102834c47e133002b212d5ea12ed4bac20 | — | |
hashd2fffbe63b70a5993cb6fb035a2f665c7fa92a75 | — | |
hashd91337af047c8b4f26e40ce8187910daf2d19a7d | — | |
hash00dbc8a4b3121af5a19504a9d969e36e709556420a6117eb3533f1d2a8100fd9 | — | |
hash03cec3b010853893310fea486ecfddf09642a7a5c695c70db77d22bc7c402234 | — | |
hash0443289b1fc556c5ef4bbfa13774500e3936d965799a9c27be0601170601094d | — | |
hash0bc51a290919c52cc62b3d8b4eed96609edf264f742d0409c975553b0cdc84a8 | — | |
hash0ec83d1deb6065cac8ba8f849cdf5672da7313ec2e860a7d71bb7e397e661394 | — | |
hash10479191f2e06ff11797fc4dda2e38ae6667c9dc396fac32a6cf76965358ade6 | — | |
hash1357b4577bd2d99546df2ef5cb4cd3bcbe2a9ee91783eb6798fc7dea660bc5e5 | — | |
hash262df5a17003b3dc06d6eb2fff89eb66709819df8219f2842bfc913be9f85c10 | — | |
hash2755de59ef87f9f38c236ed860a1f6f41a1d864126f54c4c0a7f87d4b4f63b20 | — | |
hash2cc9959ff1172366e71c8ed89be5cb23f17abce1125871fe47a9465f59e6ed17 | — | |
hash3480613294bc1e1704616dbf5628b92d7186246b87dbef1c8c3dbae13fe35c8b | — | |
hash419eabb1c4c9be3ebdd726c73c497dcd2e39245f7e72ffcb67e032fcefe5ba13 | — | |
hash42c9505c2c55b80e0e311cd6da6a5263b946c8ae8bd8162b0280a1e9be7f174b | — | |
hash4c2253777f1b6e54431c28a7a284577bda3464aa82837bbd7de57a00869f0c5b | — | |
hash6a7880e14b9f03fe281c28b93094b7b150a1360cbf64dd0b47c87e111db406ca | — | |
hash7b028a9bd2bc0c306ab6561cf702406f5925fc073f9d0d2d9408ceccd6907743 | — | |
hash906ff72d4ea9cd831c58dc009fb1bbe407e8f430208a63d3dffd3f8e1da73f6e | — | |
hasha12ed375965859d9434c9f651eef2f3663bb076963fec31723176c9083117671 | — | |
hasha92ed5f831c99bb84208ef7d7c733e0183a79de40f9d3b3be54744951f0a1391 | — | |
hashab526d5ed335860ac2fe0adee26de1a95a3c528299800ddbb4d1e2dd91267252 | — | |
hashaec2d0cbd2f195bf35e55019a29f0d6109451eb85dc7941b73e3b562b065a11c | — | |
hashb03fe49036c3830f149135068ff54f5c6c6622008a6fcb7edbf6b352e9a0acc0 | — | |
hashb1ee96026a3fc0ee55dab3b73896e88760f909b3c52d4a0152288d90e63f2e63 | — | |
hashb691b2c1846ea75bb5b07a21c8664ecdb6379685623ba45fe6ca552e94a58ebc | — | |
hashc91595edd1c9a0a2c1168e3bfa532e4a7dbb6b1380afd80ba445b728622798a4 | — | |
hashc922ef32c4ab94f8b870c62883f3e41755ec705db76ec4efb0d343458f1e28c7 | — | |
hashdef64a0564f33f39235e3778d86863565a40493ae1f5c075552611d79383b471 | — | |
hashdff0164392e12d2bbb85c630419fd349f9d87f80bdb92774c0b53d7e063e77e4 | — | |
hashe29767ffb75be9f363a39ba9b66785ecfc992e3d91ec9fc46515ef94c37dc0b6 | — | |
hashf0397688418692c467488ac37d362b9b1efdba8b60b0d99725e2b66f3e03badb | — | |
hashf0ad27f8737ac1a079a52c91d8b5cdd554cd42dccc597de8337e0c25d5287dd2 | — | |
hashf3abb0cc802f3d7b95fc8762b94bdcb13bf39634c40c357301c4aa1d67a256fb | — | |
hashfd6b1ca0f26e54fa9c97ea15c834e58ffb71798df38071ad00b14f19d6a4126c | — | |
hashfd87149d6b8fdcad5d84ba4a3ca52e1cef8f0c54cafca6dbbb5d156f313d79dd | — | |
hashfe4f88bdfff87a94bd57bc16c20d199ee548e551b4aca852bcc013d0955d7ce8 | — |
Ip
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
ip103.136.45.108 | — | |
ip103.172.10.165 | — | |
ip103.9.14.218 | — | |
ip117.239.199.202 | — | |
ip117.254.105.200 | — | |
ip123.181.24.36 | — | |
ip138.112.25.25 | — | |
ip141.164.59.111 | — | |
ip23.254.225.184 | — | |
ip36.75.75.75 | — | |
ip45.114.192.137 | — | |
ip66.42.62.253 | — | |
ip71.162.181.51 | — |
Domain
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
domain2fgithub.com | — | |
domainnewsinfom.org | — | |
domainasp.asphspes.com | — | |
domainmailserver.kozow.com | — | |
domainpay.googleinstall.com | — |
Threat ID: 68d5977082abd4e860dbde52
Added to database: 9/25/2025, 7:26:40 PM
Last enriched: 9/25/2025, 7:26:59 PM
Last updated: 9/26/2025, 7:41:06 AM
Views: 10
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