VulnerabilityPublished 9 Nov 2026

CVE-2026-77604: Code Graph RAG · MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read

Affects code-graph-ragSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-77604· High 7.5

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 0.0.345 soon.

Data as of 9 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none

CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)	CVSS 3.1	7.5

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 32% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 0.0.345

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: High: There is total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 9 Nov 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade code-graph-rag to 0.0.345.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
PyPIcode-graph-rag	Affected <0.0.345	Fixed in 0.0.345

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Description

### Summary The `read_file` MCP tool in `codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py` contains a path traversal vulnerability in its paginated branch (when `offset` or `limit` is supplied). The handler constructs a file path using `Path(self.project_root) / file_path` without subsequently validating that the resolved path remains within the configured project root. Python's `pathlib` silently discards the left-hand component when the right-hand argument is an absolute path, allowing an attacker to read any UTF-8-readable file on the server by passing an absolute path such as `/etc/passwd`. ### Details **Vulnerable location:** `codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556–565` (`MCPToolsRegistry.read_file`) The `read_file` MCP tool accepts three parameters: `file_path`, `offset`, and `limit`. When either `offset` or `limit` is present the handler takes a distinct code path: ```python # codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556-565 async def read_file( self, file_path: str, offset: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None ) -> str: logger.info(lg.MCP_READ_FILE.format(path=file_path, offset=offset, limit=limit)) try: if offset is not None or limit is not None: full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path # ← VULNERABLE LINE start = offset if offset is not None else 0 with open(full_path, encoding=cs.ENCODING_UTF8) as f: # ← SINK ``` Because `pathlib.Path.__truediv__` replaces the left operand entirely when the right operand is an absolute path, any caller-supplied absolute path (e.g., `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`) causes `full_path` to point outside the project root. The **non-paginated** branch is protected by the `@validate_project_path` decorator (applied via `codebase_rag/tools/file_reader.py:27`) which performs `.resolve().relative_to(project_root)` (`codebase_rag/decorators.py:73–75`), but this decorator is never invoked in the paginated branch, leaving it completely unguarded. **Full data-flow (source → sink):** 1. `codebase_rag/config.py:302` — HTTP MCP default host is `0.0.0.0`. 2. `codebase_rag/cli.py:717` — CLI exposes `mcp-server`. 3. `codebase_rag/cli.py:726–731` — `--transport http` invokes `serve_http(host=resolved_host, port=resolved_port)`. 4. `codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:208–210` — Starlette mounts the MCP HTTP endpoint. 5. `codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:227–249` — `read_file` is registered as an MCP tool accepting attacker-controlled `file_path`, `offset`, and `limit`. 6. `codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:113–127` — `call_tool` dispatches JSON arguments directly to the handler via `await handler(**arguments)`. 7. `codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:561–565` — paginated branch builds `full_path` and calls `open(full_path)` without any boundary check. The vulnerability is also present when using the `stdio` transport because the vulnerable code path does not depend on transport type; however, the attack is unauthenticated and network-accessible only when HTTP transport is configured. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** - Docker installed. - Repository cloned with the `vuln-001/` artifacts present (Dockerfile, poc.py). **Build and run:** ```bash # From the repository root (parent of vuln-001/) docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile . docker run --rm vuln001-poc ``` The Dockerfile installs the `codebase_rag` package from the local repository source, creates a "safe" project root at `/tmp/safe-project-root`, and runs `poc.py`. **What the PoC does (`poc.py`):** 1. Pre-mocks the `mgclient` / `pymgclient` native C extensions (Memgraph client) so the package imports without a live database. 2. Instantiates `MCPToolsRegistry` via `object.__new__()`, setting only `self.project_root = "/tmp/safe-project-root"` — matching what the real server does. 3. Demonstrates the pathlib bypass: `Path("/tmp/safe-project-root") / "/etc/hosts"` resolves to `Path("/etc/hosts")`. 4. Calls `registry.read_file("/etc/hosts", offset=0, limit=5)` — the actual vulnerable method from the installed package. 5. Asserts that real `/etc/hosts` content is returned, confirming full boundary bypass. **Expected output:** ``` [MCP] read_file: /etc/hosts (offset=0, limit=5) [+] CONFIRMED: pathlib discards project_root when file_path is absolute [+] read_file() returned: # Lines 1-5 of 7 127.0.0.1 localhost ::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback fe00:: ip6-localnet ff00:: ip6-mcastprefix ff02::1 ip6-allnodes [+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL [+] Content of '/etc/hosts' exfiltrated via path traversal [+] Project root boundary '/tmp/safe-project-root' was completely bypassed [+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: VULN-001 CWE-22 Path Traversal ``` **Equivalent HTTP transport attack (when server is running):** ```bash python3 - <<'PY' import anyio from mcp import ClientSession from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client async def main(): async with streamablehttp_client("http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp") as (read, write, _): async with ClientSession(read, write) as session: await session.i

CWE-22Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal) (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #6OWASP Top 10 A01:2025: Broken Access Control (opens in a new tab)
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Implementation · Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
Architecture and Design
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks…
Implementation · Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174).
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Authorization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V12.3.1 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
Path Traversal (opens in a new tab)
Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic (opens in a new tab)
Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls (opens in a new tab)
Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding (opens in a new tab)
Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

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Description

WeaknessesCWE-22

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