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CVE-2026-55158VulnerabilityPublished

wktk/conflibot · conflibot vulnerable to command injection via crafted pull request branch names under pull_request_target

Affects wktk/conflibotSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-55158· Critical 9.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 1.2.1 as a priority.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 09:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 56% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.2.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade wktk/conflibot to 1.2.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubwktk/conflibotAffected
  • <1.2.1
Fixed in
  • 1.2.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Impact Versions of conflibot before `1.2.1` build `git` commands by string interpolation and run them through a shell. Several of the interpolated values are pull request branch names (`head.ref`), which are attacker-controlled: anyone can open a pull request (including from a fork) whose head branch name contains shell metacharacters such as `` ` ``, `$( )`, `;`, `|`, or `&`. The recommended workflow runs conflibot on the `pull_request_target` event, where the job has access to the base repository's secrets and a write-scoped `GITHUB_TOKEN`. As a result, a crafted branch name causes arbitrary command execution on the runner with that write token in the environment, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate secrets and the token, push to the repository, or otherwise abuse the token's permissions. No special privileges and no maintainer interaction are required — the action runs automatically when the pull request is opened. ### Affected configurations Any workflow using `wktk/conflibot` at a version earlier than `1.2.1`. The risk is highest under `pull_request_target` (the documented configuration), because that is where the write token and secrets are exposed to attacker-influenced refs. ### Patches Fixed in `1.2.1` and `2.0.0`. All `git` invocations now use argument arrays via `execFile`/`spawn` instead of a shell, so branch names can no longer be interpreted as shell syntax, and pull requests are referenced by number through `refs/pull/<n>/head` rather than by branch name. ### Workarounds Upgrade to `wktk/conflibot@v2`. On GitHub-hosted runners this is a drop-in upgrade; self-hosted runners additionally need Node.js 24 support and git 2.38 or later. ### Resources - Fix (v2.0.0): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/0107ac6 - Fix (v1.2.1): https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/commit/59e255c - Releases: https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v2.0.0 and https://github.com/wktk/conflibot/releases/tag/v1.2.1

References

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