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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-33489: github.com/coredns/coredns · CoreDNS' transfer stanza selection uses lexicographic compare (subzone ACL bypass)

Affects github.com/coredns/corednsSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-33489· High 8.2

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 1.14.3 soon.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.14.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 5 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade github.com/coredns/coredns to 1.14.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Gogithub.com/coredns/corednsAffected
  • <1.14.3
Fixed in
  • 1.14.3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary CoreDNS' transfer plugin can select the wrong ACL stanza when both a parent zone and a more-specific subzone are configured. A permissive parent-zone transfer rule can override a restrictive subzone rule (name-dependent), allowing an unauthorized client to perform AXFR/IXFR for the subzone and retrieve its zone contents. ### Details In plugin/transfer/transfer.go, stanza selection is implemented by longestMatch(), which is documented as "longest zone match wins", but it actually chooses the winner via a lexicographic string comparison: - zone := "" // longest zone match wins (plugin/transfer/transfer.go) - if z > zone { zone = z; x = xfr } (plugin/transfer/transfer.go) So, a parent zone like example.org. can beat a child zone like a.example.org. purely due to lexicographic ordering ("example.org." > "a.example.org."), even though the child zone is the longer/more specific suffix match. The bypass is data-dependent (some child labels will win, some will lose), making it operationally non-intuitive. ### PoC 1. Adjust COREDNS_BIN in the PoC to point at right path (see the top-level const definitions for tunables as well) 2. Run python3 ./acl-repro.py 3. Expected output: *** Baseline (only subzone transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=5 ancount=0 (expected REFUSED=5) *** Candidate (add permissive parent transfer rule) *** axfr a.example.org.: rcode=0 ancount=5 (expected NOERROR=0 with ancount>0) *** OK *** Subzone transfer ACL bypass reproduced: adding a permissive parent-zone stanza can override a stricter child-zone stanza due to lexicographic zone selection. ### Impact Unauthorized zone transfer can expose full zone contents to a remote network client that was intended to be denied by a subzone-specific transfer policy.

References

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