CVE-2022-39273 is a medium-severity vulnerability affecting flyteorg's FlyteAdmin, the control plane component of the Flyte data processing platform. The vulnerability arises from the use of hard-coded credentials within FlyteAdmin's default authorization server configuration. Specifically, when administrators enable Flyte's internal authentication server but do not override the default client ID hashes and associated hardcoded hashed password, this default credential remains active and accessible. This default password is also embedded in the Flyte Propeller configuration map distributed via Flyte Helm charts. Consequently, if the ExternalAuthorizationServer setting is not specified, the system continues to accept authentication requests using these default credentials, effectively allowing unauthorized public internet access. Attackers can exploit this by impersonating Flyte Propeller, gaining unauthorized access to FlyteAdmin's control plane functionalities. Importantly, this vulnerability does not affect users who configure an external authorization server, as this setting disables the vulnerable default internal authentication configuration. The issue was addressed in FlyteAdmin version 1.1.44, where users are advised to manually configure the staticClients parameter in the selfAuthServer section to replace the default credentials if relying on the internal auth server. No known exploits have been reported in the wild to date. The vulnerability is categorized under CWE-798, indicating the use of hard-coded credentials, which is a common security anti-pattern leading to unauthorized access risks.

For European organizations utilizing FlyteAdmin versions prior to 1.1.44 without configuring an external authorization server, this vulnerability poses a significant risk of unauthorized access to their data processing control plane. Unauthorized actors could impersonate Flyte Propeller, potentially manipulating workflows, accessing sensitive data, or disrupting data processing pipelines. This could lead to data confidentiality breaches, integrity violations through unauthorized modifications, and availability issues if workflows are disrupted or manipulated. Given Flyte's role in orchestrating complex data workflows, such unauthorized access could have cascading effects on dependent business processes, analytics, and decision-making systems. The risk is heightened for organizations exposing FlyteAdmin to the public internet without proper configuration, increasing the attack surface. However, the absence of known exploits and the medium severity rating suggest that exploitation requires specific misconfigurations and knowledge of the default credentials. Organizations using external authorization servers are not affected, reducing the scope of impact. Nonetheless, the vulnerability underscores the importance of secure default configurations in cloud-native data platforms.

European organizations should take the following specific actions to mitigate this vulnerability: 1) Immediately upgrade FlyteAdmin to version 1.1.44 or later, where the issue is resolved. 2) If upgrading is not immediately feasible, explicitly configure the staticClients parameter within the selfAuthServer section of FlyteAdmin's configuration to replace the default hardcoded client ID hashes and passwords with unique, strong credentials. 3) Preferably, configure and integrate an external authorization server for FlyteAdmin, which automatically disables the vulnerable internal default authentication and provides more robust, centralized access control. 4) Audit existing FlyteAdmin deployments to identify any instances where the ExternalAuthorizationServer setting is unset and default credentials remain active, especially in environments exposed to public networks. 5) Restrict network access to FlyteAdmin control plane endpoints using network segmentation, firewalls, or VPNs to limit exposure to trusted internal users only. 6) Monitor authentication logs for unusual access patterns that could indicate attempts to exploit default credentials. 7) Review and update Helm charts and deployment automation scripts to ensure they do not deploy default configurations with hardcoded credentials. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on configuration auditing, network access controls, and deployment hygiene specific to FlyteAdmin's architecture.