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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2024-14037: Guangzhou Red Sea Cloud Computing Red Sea Cloud eHR · Unrestricted File Upload

Affects Guangzhou Red Sea Cloud Computing Red Sea Cloud eHRSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical.

Data as of 14 Nov 2026, 20:43 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.3Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
1.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 70% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 14 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Guangzhou Red Sea Cloud Computing Co., Ltd.Red Sea Cloud eHRAffected
  • *
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict access to the PtFjk.mob servlet endpoint if possible, and monitor for suspicious file uploads or webshell activity. Avoid exposing the uploadfile directory to direct web access if feasible.

Description

Redsea Cloud eHR contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to achieve remote code execution by uploading malicious files through the PtFjk.mob servlet endpoint. Attackers can submit a multipart POST request with a JSP webshell disguised using a spoofed image/jpeg Content-Type to bypass the absence of extension and MIME type validation, with the uploaded file stored at a predictable path under the uploadfile directory and executed directly by the web server. Exploitation evidence was first observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2024-11-03 (UTC).

References

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