CVE-2024-25389: rt-thread · PRNG
Affects rt-threadSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 15:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 57% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 Mar 2024
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
GitHubrt-thread/rt-threadpkg:github/rt-thread/rt-threadOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
- Replace the weak linear congruential random number generator with a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG), such as those based on hardware entropy sources or well-vetted algorithms like Fortuna or ChaCha20-based RNGs.
- Apply vendor patches or updates as soon as they become available; if none exist, consider custom firmware updates to address the RNG implementation.
- Audit all cryptographic operations and security mechanisms relying on the RNG to ensure they are not vulnerable to prediction attacks.
- Implement additional entropy sources where possible, such as hardware random number generators or environmental noise, to strengthen randomness.
- Monitor network traffic and device behavior for anomalies that could indicate exploitation attempts targeting predictable RNG outputs.
- For critical deployments, consider isolating affected devices or limiting their network exposure until mitigations are in place.
- Engage with RT-Thread maintainers or vendors to prioritize a secure RNG implementation and timely patch releases.
- Educate development and security teams on the importance of secure randomness in embedded systems to prevent similar issues.
Description
RT-Thread through 5.0.2 generates random numbers with a weak algorithm of "seed = 214013L * seed + 2531011L; return (seed >> 16) & 0x7FFF;" in calc_random in drivers/misc/rt_random.c.
References
- github.com/RT-Thread/rt-thread/issues/8283 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/hnsecurity/vulns/blob/main/HNS-2024-05-rt-thread.txt (opens in a new tab)
- security.humanativaspa.it/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-rt-thread-rtos/ (opens in a new tab)
- seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/28 (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/03/05/1 (opens in a new tab)
- seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/28 (opens in a new tab)