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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-28836: mbedtls

Affects mbedtlsSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.4 Medium : upgrade to 3.6.0 when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.4Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 3.6.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 3 Apr 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade mbed-tls/mbedtls to 3.6.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubmbed-tls/mbedtlspkg:github/mbed-tls/mbedtlsOther threatsAffected
  • <3.6.0
Fixed in
  • 3.6.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

To mitigate CVE-2024-28836, organizations should upgrade Mbed TLS to version 3.6.0 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed. If upgrading immediately is not feasible, consider the following specific measures: 1) Avoid disabling TLS 1.2 at build time if TLS 1.2 clients are expected, or ensure proper handling of ClientHello messages to prevent infinite loops. 2) Implement network-level filtering to block TLS 1.2 ClientHello messages from untrusted sources to reduce attack surface. 3) Monitor server logs for repeated TLS 1.2 handshake attempts that may indicate exploitation attempts. 4) Test TLS configurations thoroughly to confirm that disabling TLS 1.2 does not allow fallback or unintended connections. 5) For embedded or IoT devices using Mbed TLS, coordinate with vendors for firmware updates addressing this issue. 6) Employ rate limiting and DoS protection mechanisms at the network perimeter to mitigate potential impact from repeated handshake attempts. These targeted steps go beyond generic TLS hardening by addressing the specific negotiation flaw and its operational context.

Description

An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.x before 3.6.0. When negotiating the TLS version on the server side, it can fall back to the TLS 1.2 implementation of the protocol if it is disabled. If the TLS 1.2 implementation was disabled at build time, a TLS 1.2 client could put a TLS 1.3-only server into an infinite loop processing a TLS 1.2 ClientHello, resulting in a denial of service. If the TLS 1.2 implementation was disabled at runtime, a TLS 1.2 client can successfully establish a TLS 1.2 connection with the server.

References

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