CVE-2024-34048: Improper Validation of Array Index
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 47% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 29 Apr 2024
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
To mitigate CVE-2024-34048, organizations should: 1) Monitor vendor communications closely for patches or updates addressing this vulnerability and apply them immediately upon release. 2) Implement strict network segmentation to isolate O-RAN RIC components from less trusted networks, limiting exposure to potential attackers. 3) Deploy intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) with signatures or heuristics tuned to detect anomalous traffic targeting the e2mgr service or unusual E2 node configuration update messages. 4) Conduct regular security audits and code reviews of O-RAN software deployments to identify and remediate similar memory safety issues proactively. 5) Employ runtime application self-protection (RASP) or memory protection techniques such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) to reduce exploitation likelihood. 6) Restrict administrative access to O-RAN RIC components using strong authentication and least privilege principles. 7) Prepare incident response plans specifically addressing potential telecom infrastructure compromises. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on the unique operational context of O-RAN and the criticality of the e2mgr module.
Description
O-RAN RIC I-Release e2mgr lacks array size checks in E2nodeConfigUpdateNotificationHandler.