CVE-2024-45193: olm · Weak Cryptography
Affects olmSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium · end of life, no fix coming : replace or isolate olm; no fix will be released.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 15:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- None coming – the product is end of life
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 22 Aug 2024
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
No fix will be released: olm is end of life. Replace it, or isolate it from untrusted networks until you can.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
GitHubmatrix-org/olmpkg:github/matrix-org/olmOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Given that the vulnerability affects only unsupported products using libolm and no patches are available, mitigation strategies should focus on migration and risk reduction. Organizations should: 1) Identify and inventory all systems using Matrix libolm versions up to 3.2.16 or unsupported forks. 2) Upgrade to supported Matrix implementations or cryptographic libraries that have addressed Ed25519 signature validation properly, ensuring S < n checks are enforced. 3) If upgrading is not immediately possible, isolate vulnerable systems from untrusted networks to reduce exploitation risk. 4) Employ additional cryptographic verification layers or application-level signature checks where feasible to detect malleable signatures. 5) Monitor network traffic and logs for anomalous signature patterns or replay attempts. 6) Engage with Matrix community or maintainers for guidance on secure alternatives or patches. 7) Plan deprecation of legacy Matrix deployments relying on vulnerable libolm versions. These steps go beyond generic advice by emphasizing inventory, isolation, layered verification, and community engagement.
Description
An issue was discovered in Matrix libolm through 3.2.16. There is Ed25519 signature malleability due to lack of validation criteria (does not ensure that S < n). This refers to the libolm implementation of Olm. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.