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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-38349: Linux kernel · Use After Free

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High · fixed in 6.8.0-1046.49~22.04.1 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 7% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 6.8.0-1046.49~22.04.1, 6.8.0-1051.57~22.04.1, 6.8.0-1047.50~22.04.2 +29
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Jul 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Ubuntu 25.10linux-azure-fdepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-fde@6.17.0-1017.17?arch=source&distro=questingOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-1003.3 – 6.17.0-1017.17
10 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinuxpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux@6.8.0-100.100?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-100.100
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-100.100
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-awspkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws@6.8.0-1046.49?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1046.49
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1046.49
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-aws-6.14pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws-6.14@6.14.0-1017.17~24.04.1?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.14.0-1017.17~24.04.1
Fixed in
  • 6.14.0-1017.17~24.04.1
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-azurepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure@6.8.0-1046.52?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • <6.8.0-1046.52
Fixed in
  • 6.8.0-1046.52
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSlinux-azure-6.11pkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-6.11@6.11.0-1018.18~24.04.1?arch=source&distro=nobleOther threatsAffected
  • 6.11.0-1008.8~24.04.1 – 6.11.0-1018.18~24.04.1
7 affected builds
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then doing a mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx); afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free. That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after it has unlocked the mutex. But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody *else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're still using the mutex. Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership, even if they guarantee mutual exclusion. A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the first user is still cleaning up. See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst, in particular the section [1] about semantics: "mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore" So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops _their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it. Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex: the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently about object lifetimes).

References

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