CVE-2025-49600: Mbed mbedtls · Missing Cryptographic Step
Affects Mbed mbedtlsSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.9 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 09:15 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 4% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 Jul 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
GitHubmbed-tls/mbedtlspkg:github/mbed-tls/mbedtlsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
European organizations should first identify all systems and devices using affected MbedTLS versions (3.3.0 up to 3.6.4) with hardware-accelerated hashing enabled. Immediate mitigation steps include: 1) Upgrading MbedTLS to version 3.6.4 or later where the vulnerability is fixed. 2) If upgrading is not immediately feasible, disabling hardware acceleration for hashing temporarily to force use of the software SHA-256 implementation, which is not vulnerable. 3) Implementing hardware fault detection and mitigation mechanisms to prevent fault injection attacks, such as monitoring for abnormal hardware behavior or using hardware with built-in fault resistance. 4) Enhancing code auditing and error checking in cryptographic verification functions to ensure all return values are validated. 5) Employing layered security controls such as code signing with multiple independent verification steps and runtime integrity checks to detect forged signatures. 6) Monitoring for anomalous signature verification failures or suspicious activity that may indicate exploitation attempts. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on the specific fault injection vector and hardware acceleration context of this vulnerability.
Description
In MbedTLS 3.3.0 before 3.6.4, mbedtls_lms_verify may accept invalid signatures if hash computation fails and internal errors go unchecked, enabling LMS (Leighton-Micali Signature) forgery in a fault scenario. Specifically, unchecked return values in mbedtls_lms_verify allow an attacker (who can induce a hardware hash accelerator fault) to bypass LMS signature verification by reusing stale stack data, resulting in acceptance of an invalid signature. In mbedtls_lms_verify, the return values of the internal Merkle tree functions create_merkle_leaf_value and create_merkle_internal_value are not checked. These functions return an integer that indicates whether the call succeeded or not. If a failure occurs, the output buffer (Tc_candidate_root_node) may remain uninitialized, and the result of the signature verification is unpredictable. When the software implementation of SHA-256 is used, these functions will not fail. However, with hardware-accelerated hashing, an attacker could use fault injection against the accelerator to bypass verification.