CVE-2025-59694: Improper Access Control for Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.8 Medium · fixed in 13.6.12 : update affected systems when convenient.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 12:55 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 24% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 13.6.12
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Dec 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
European organizations should immediately review and strengthen physical security controls around Entrust nShield HSM appliances to prevent unauthorized physical access, including secure data center access policies, surveillance, and tamper-evident seals. Implement strict access controls and monitoring for personnel with physical access to HSM hardware. Employ hardware inventory and firmware integrity verification tools to detect unauthorized firmware modifications. Coordinate with Entrust to obtain and apply any forthcoming firmware patches or updates addressing this vulnerability. Consider deploying hardware security modules with secure boot and firmware validation features that resist unauthorized firmware changes. Establish incident response plans that include procedures for detecting and responding to firmware tampering. Regularly audit and log all firmware upgrade activities and restrict firmware upgrade capabilities to trusted administrators. For critical systems, consider redundant HSM deployments and key backup strategies to maintain cryptographic operations if a device is compromised. Finally, educate staff about the risks of physical attacks and insider threats related to hardware security modules.
Description
The Chassis Management Board in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allows a physically proximate attacker to persistently modify firmware and influence the (insecurely configured) appliance boot process. To exploit this, the attacker must modify the firmware via JTAG or perform an upgrade to the chassis management board firmware. This is called F03.
References
- entrust.com/use-case/why-use-an-hsm (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-6q4x-m86j-gfwj (opens in a new tab)
- entrust.com/knowledgebase/hardware/understanding-nshield-security-advisory-september-2025 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-7gqq-6vwr-4g3v (opens in a new tab)