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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-100619: Cap-go capgo.app · Incorrect Privilege Assignment

Affects Cap-go capgo.appSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High · patch available : patch Cap-go capgo.app soon.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 35% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 11 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Cap-gocapgo.appAffected
  • All versions
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

A patch is available for this vulnerability. Since capgo.app is a cloud-hosted service, the vendor manages remediation server-side. Users should apply the official patch or update as recommended by the vendor to mitigate this issue. Until patched, restrict API key permissions and write+ rights to trusted principals only.

Description

Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is 'r2-direct', which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path.

References

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