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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-100650: vllm · Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Affects vllmSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 0.29.0 soon.

Data as of 9 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 57% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.29.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 26 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade vllm and github/vllm-project/vllm to 0.29.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
vllm-projectvllmAffected
  • <0.29.0
Fixed in
  • 0.29.0
crates.iogithub/vllm-project/vllmpkg:cargo/github/vllm-project/vllmOther threatsAffected
  • <0.29.0
Fixed in
  • 0.29.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, limit exposure by restricting access to the unauthenticated Rust frontend /tokenize route and monitor for unusually large or numerous media requests. Apply API key requirements where possible to reduce attack surface.

Description

vLLM through 0.29.0 fetches and fully materializes remote or inline media before enforcing its documented media controls (the VLLM_MAX_AUDIO_CLIP_FILESIZE_MB compressed-audio size cap, default 25 MB, and the per-modality --limit-mm-per-prompt item limits). Across four ingress paths — the shared media-acquisition layer (HTTPConnection.get_bytes()/async_get_bytes()), the chat completions audio_url/base64 path, the batch speech runner, and the Rust frontend POST /tokenize route — the server reads the entire HTTP response body, base64-decodes the inline payload, or spawns one fetch/decode task per media part, and only then applies the limit (or, on some paths, never applies it). A remote attacker can therefore cause the API server or batch-runner process to allocate memory and consume outbound bandwidth proportional to an attacker-chosen body size or media item count before the request is rejected, resulting in pre-inference memory and bandwidth exhaustion (denial of service). The chat and batch surfaces require an API key when one is configured; the Rust frontend /tokenize route is unauthenticated by design. There is no code execution or data disclosure impact.

References

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