CVE-2026-104380: WebSockets · Missing Origin Validation
Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 5% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.
What to do
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, consider restricting cross-origin WebSocket connections or implementing additional Origin validation at the application level for Extended CONNECT requests on HTTP/2 and HTTP/3.
Description
Punk versions from 0.48 before 0.55 for Perl route Extended CONNECT requests to any GET route without an Origin check in ps_serve_one. On HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 a WebSocket handshake arrives as an Extended CONNECT, which is matched as a GET and so reaches every GET route, API operation and mount. The Origin check runs only when a websocket route matches. On this transport the handler's status is the handshake response, and a 2xx accepts it. A cross-origin page can open a WebSocket to any path and learn from its open or error event whether that path returns 2xx.