CVE-2026-107587: Progressive Robot hMailServer · Improper Certificate Validation
Affects Progressive Robot hMailServerSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 6.3.6 when convenient.
Data as of 21 Nov 2026, 17:34 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 6% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 6.3.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 21 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade hMailServer and hmailserver/hmailserver to 6.3.6.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Progressive Robot LtdhMailServer | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubhmailserver/hmailserverpkg:github/hmailserver/hmailserverOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, users should exercise caution when handling S/MIME-encrypted emails in affected versions. Avoid opening signed messages from untrusted sources in the webmail interface to reduce risk.
Description
Improper certificate validation in the webmail of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.2 through 6.3.5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have S/MIME-encrypted mail that the account later sends to another correspondent also encrypted to the attacker's key. When its recipient opened a signed message, the webmail kept the signer's certificate for encrypting replies whether or not the server found its chain trusted, under the first e-mail address the certificate listed rather than the message's From address, and beside any certificate already held for that address. Encrypted mail later sent from the webmail to that address was encrypted to every certificate held for it, so a holder of the kept certificate's key who obtains a copy of such a message can read it.