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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-107587: Progressive Robot hMailServer · Improper Certificate Validation

Affects Progressive Robot hMailServerSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 6.3.6 when convenient.

Data as of 21 Nov 2026, 17:34 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 6% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 6.3.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 21 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade hMailServer and hmailserver/hmailserver to 6.3.6.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Progressive Robot LtdhMailServerAffected
  • >=6.3.2 <6.3.6
Fixed in
  • 6.3.6
GitHubhmailserver/hmailserverpkg:github/hmailserver/hmailserverOther threatsAffected
  • >=6.3.2 <6.3.6
Fixed in
  • 6.3.6

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, users should exercise caution when handling S/MIME-encrypted emails in affected versions. Avoid opening signed messages from untrusted sources in the webmail interface to reduce risk.

Description

Improper certificate validation in the webmail of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.2 through 6.3.5 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have S/MIME-encrypted mail that the account later sends to another correspondent also encrypted to the attacker's key. When its recipient opened a signed message, the webmail kept the signer's certificate for encrypting replies whether or not the server found its chain trusted, under the first e-mail address the certificate listed rather than the message's From address, and beside any certificate already held for that address. Encrypted mail later sent from the webmail to that address was encrypted to every certificate held for it, so a holder of the kept certificate's key who obtains a copy of such a message can read it.

References

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