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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-107615: GlavSoft TightVNC · Uncontrolled Search Path Element

Affects GlavSoft TightVNCSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High : upgrade to 2.8.88 soon.

Data as of 21 Nov 2026, 17:34 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.8.88
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 21 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade GlavSoft TightVNC to 2.8.88.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GlavSoftTightVNCAffected
  • <2.8.88
Fixed in
  • 2.8.88

AI-suggested

A patch is available for this vulnerability. Users should upgrade TightVNC Server to version 2.8.88 or later to remediate this issue. Since this is a local privilege escalation vulnerability, restricting local user access and ensuring proper directory permissions can reduce risk but do not replace applying the official fix.

Description

An uncontrolled search path element vulnerability in GlavSoft TightVNC Server for Windows before 2.8.88 allows a local authenticated user to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. DynamicLibrary::init() (and ThemeLib) load screenhooks32.dll / screenhooks64.dll with LoadLibrary() using a bare file name and no LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_* flags, so the TightVNC service follows the default DLL search order and loads an attacker-planted DLL from a writable directory earlier in that order (for example, an installation directory with permissive ACLs).

References

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