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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-11368: zephyrproject zephyr · Use After Free

Affects zephyrproject zephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 4.4.2 soon.

Data as of 3 Nov 2026, 10:57 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.4.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 4 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 3 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to 4.4.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
zephyrprojectzephyrAffected
  • >=4.4.0 <4.4.2
Fixed in
  • 4.4.2
GitHubzephyrpkg:github/zephyrOther threatsAffected
  • >=4.4.0 <4.4.2
Fixed in
  • 4.4.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The described fix involves nullifying the channel pointer in the metadata before freeing the channel to prevent use-after-free callbacks. If you cannot patch yet, consider limiting exposure to untrusted Bluetooth peers or disabling ATT traffic if feasible.

Description

The Bluetooth host ATT layer (subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c) associates each in-flight ATT TX buffer with its owning channel via the static tx_meta_data_storage[] array (data->att_chan = chan). When a buffer's last reference is dropped, its net-buf destroy callback defers the completion handling to the system workqueue (att_tx_destroy -> att_tx_destroy_work_handler -> att_on_sent_cb -> bt_att_sent), where bt_att_sent dereferences the channel and its ATT context (sys_slist_get(&att->reqs)). When a peer disconnects while an ATT PDU (a server notification/indication or any response) is still in flight in the controller TX path, L2CAP tears the channel down in l2cap_chan_del(): it runs the disconnected callback and then the released callback (bt_att_released), which frees the channel slab slot. Because the in-flight buffer is held by the connection TX path rather than the channel's own queue, its deferred destroy work can run after the channel has been freed. The att_on_sent_cb guard intended to drop the stale callback itself dereferences meta->att_chan, which is now a dangling pointer into a freed (and possibly reused) slab slot. A remote peer with an ATT connection can drive this by disconnecting during routine ATT traffic; no pairing or user interaction is required to reach the ATT bearer. The result is a use-after-free read/write of freed channel memory, reliably crashing the Bluetooth host (denial of service) and, because the channel slab slot may be reused, potentially corrupting live memory. The fix makes bt_att_released() NULL the att_chan field of every tx_meta_data_storage[] entry still referencing the channel before freeing it, so the deferred guard observes a NULL pointer and drops the callback. Teardown and the destroy work both run on the cooperative system workqueue, so the array update is serialized and needs no lock.

References

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