CVE-2026-119631: Kirki (WordPress plugin) · Missing Authorization
Affects Kirki (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 13:49 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (Wordfence) | CVSS 3.1 | 5.9 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| themeumKirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder & Customizer | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
The Kirki - Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder & Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthorized Data Access in versions up to, and including, 6.4.1 via the `kirki_post_apis` AJAX action's `get-dynamic-content-batch` and `get-collection-batch` endpoints. This is due to the plugin opening these resolvers behind a site-wide, resource-unbound preview token (`EditorPreview::has_valid_token()`) that is NOT bound to the specific page the administrator intended to share, combined with the absence of any `list_users` or `can_user_read_post()` capability check inside `HelperFunctions::get_user_dynamic_content()` and `Collection::get_collection_batch()` — the equivalent checks ARE present on the plugin's own REST route (`FrontendRESTController::get_item_permissions_check()`). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers holding any valid read-only share link to extract from the entire user table every user's `user_email`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `nickname`, `registered_date`, arbitrary string-valued `user_meta` (including custom keys such as `billing_phone`), and the e-mail address of every approved commenter — information that WordPress itself withholds from anonymous readers (served only in the `edit` context behind `list_users`).
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/60c1185d-3412-4b51-8bb7-8c6f79c5f580?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/Ajax.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/HelperFunctions.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/Ajax/DynamicContent.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/HelperFunctions.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/Ajax/DynamicContent.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/Ajax.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/kirki/tags/6.4.1/includes/Ajax/Collection.php (opens in a new tab)
- wordpress.org/plugins/kirki/ (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3793913/kirki/trunk/includes/HelperFunctions.php (opens in a new tab)