Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-119631: Kirki (WordPress plugin) · Missing Authorization

Affects Kirki (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5

0
Compare

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium.

Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 13:49 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (Wordfence)CVSS 3.15.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
themeumKirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder & CustomizerAffected
  • <=6.4.1
Fixed in–

Description

The Kirki - Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder & Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthorized Data Access in versions up to, and including, 6.4.1 via the `kirki_post_apis` AJAX action's `get-dynamic-content-batch` and `get-collection-batch` endpoints. This is due to the plugin opening these resolvers behind a site-wide, resource-unbound preview token (`EditorPreview::has_valid_token()`) that is NOT bound to the specific page the administrator intended to share, combined with the absence of any `list_users` or `can_user_read_post()` capability check inside `HelperFunctions::get_user_dynamic_content()` and `Collection::get_collection_batch()` — the equivalent checks ARE present on the plugin's own REST route (`FrontendRESTController::get_item_permissions_check()`). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers holding any valid read-only share link to extract from the entire user table every user's `user_email`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `nickname`, `registered_date`, arbitrary string-valued `user_meta` (including custom keys such as `billing_phone`), and the e-mail address of every approved commenter — information that WordPress itself withholds from anonymous readers (served only in the `edit` context behind `list_users`).

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…