CVE-2026-123769: SureDash (WordPress plugin) · Improper Privilege Management
Affects SureDash (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High.
Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 09:44 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (Wordfence) | CVSS 3.1 | 8.8 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| brainstormforceSureDash – Community, Courses & Member Dashboard | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
The SureDash – Community, Courses & Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2f317dcd-dc4f-482a-8faa-91cd9c022276?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/sanitizer.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/settings.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/services/router.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/backend.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/social-logins.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3794229/suredash/trunk/core/routers/backend.php (opens in a new tab)