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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-12616: Eclipse CSI – PIA · Log Injection

Affects Eclipse CSI – PIASource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 45% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 29 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Eclipse FoundationEclipse CSI - PIAAffected
  • <=0.2.1
Fixed in–
GitHubEclipse CSI - PIApkg:github/Eclipse CSI - PIAOther threatsAffected
  • <=0.2.1
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, users should be aware of the risk of log forgery and consider additional monitoring or validation of log integrity. Avoid relying solely on these logs for authentication verification. Implementing input validation or output encoding for log entries involving untrusted data is recommended once a patch is released.

Description

The /v1/upload/sbom endpoint extracts the iss claim from the attacker-supplied JWT with signature verification disabled, then interpolates that string into three log statements before any validation gate. Because the configured log format ("%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s") renders newlines literally, an unauthenticated attacker can forge log records that are byte-for-byte indistinguishable from PIA's genuine "Successfully authenticated project" message. PIA is an authentication broker whose logs are explicitly relied upon for incident response (DESIGN.md §5.4 lists "Token verifications" and "Errors" as events to log), so the ability to plant fake auth-success entries directly undermines the audit trail the service exists to produce.

References

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