CVE-2026-12740: CORNELIUS Plack::Middleware::OAuth · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Affects CORNELIUS Plack::Middleware::OAuthSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.1 High.
Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 14% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 4 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| CORNELIUSPlack::Middleware::OAuth | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubPlack-Middleware-OAuthpkg:github/Plack-Middleware-OAuthOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, applications using Plack::Middleware::OAuth for OAuth 2.0 login should implement their own verification of the OAuth 2.0 state parameter to bind authorization callbacks to the initiating session, preventing CSRF attacks. Avoid relying solely on the vulnerable middleware for OAuth 2.0 flows.
Description
Plack::Middleware::OAuth versions through 0.10 for Perl do not support the OAuth 2.0 state parameter. RequestTokenV2 builds the provider authorization redirect without issuing a state value, and AccessTokenV2 exchanges the callback code and registers the resulting token into the session (register_session) without verifying that the callback corresponds to an authorization request this session initiated. Any application that uses this middleware for OAuth 2.0 login is exposed to login cross-site request forgery: because the callback is not bound to the session that began the flow, an attacker who starts an authorization with their own provider account can deliver the resulting callback to a victim, causing the victim's session to complete the attacker's authorization and associating the attacker's provider identity and access token with that session. Where the application persists this as an account link, the attacker may retain access to the victim's account through their own provider credentials.
References
- rt.cpan.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=179874 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/c9s/Plack-Middleware-OAuth/pull/13 (opens in a new tab)
- security.metacpan.org/patches/P/Plack-Middleware-OAuth/0.10/CVE-2026-12740-r1.patch (opens in a new tab)
- datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749 (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/04/10 (opens in a new tab)