CVE-2026-13048: Data-MuForm (Perl module) · Eval Injection
Affects Data-MuForm (Perl module)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High.
Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 11:37 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CISA-ADP | CVSS 3.1 | 8.2 |
|---|
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 46% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Data-MuForm | Affected
| Fixed in– |
CPANData-MuFormpkg:cpan/Data-MuFormOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, do not allow untrusted input to control the language attribute used by Data::MuForm::Localizer. Restrict file system permissions to prevent attackers from placing arbitrary .po files in locations readable by the application. Validate or sanitize the language attribute to prevent path traversal sequences.
Description
Data::MuForm::Localizer versions through 0.05 for Perl execute Perl from a message catalog header, reached at an arbitrary path because load_lexicon interpolates the language attribute into the catalog filename. load_lexicon builds the catalog path by appending `Messages/$lang.po` to the directory holding Localizer.pm, where $lang is the language attribute, with no check that it names a bare locale tag. A value holding `../` segments walks out of the message directory, so any readable path with a `.po` suffix is loaded. While parsing the catalog, extract_header_msgstr takes the `Plural-Forms:` header, prefixes `$` to the bare words nplurals, plural and n, and passes the rest verbatim into a string that is evaluated: the nplurals form evaluates the header expression immediately, and the plural_code form compiles it into a subroutine whose body runs when a plural message is localized. A header of `nplurals=2; plural=(system('...'),0);` therefore runs that command as the catalog loads. The evaluation inherits strict, so an expression that assigns to an undeclared variable fails to compile, while one built from calls alone does not. An application that sets the language attribute from request data, an Accept-Language header or a locale parameter, and an attacker who can place a file with a `.po` suffix and chosen contents at a readable path, together give code execution as the application user. The message expansion path is not affected: expand_named substitutes only the placeholder names the caller supplies, and _mangle_value returns the value unchanged.
References
- security.metacpan.org/patches/D/Data-MuForm/0.05/CVE-2026-13048-r2.patch (opens in a new tab)
- metacpan.org/release/GSHANK/Data-MuForm-0.05/source/lib/Data/MuForm/Localizer.pm (opens in a new tab)
- metacpan.org/release/GSHANK/Data-MuForm-0.05/source/lib/Data/MuForm/Localizer.pm (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/13/10 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/gshank/data-muform/pull/19 (opens in a new tab)