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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-133190: misp · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affects mispSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.7 Low.

Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 14:49 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
3.7Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (CIRCL)CVSS 3.13.7
CNA (CIRCL)CVSS 4.06.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
mispmispAffected
  • <=2.5.51
Fixed in–
GitHubmisppkg:github/mispOther threatsAffected
  • <=2.5.51
Fixed in–

CPE configurations (1)

  • cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

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Description

MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events. First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance. Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes. A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response. Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.

References

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