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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-13358: Simply Schedule Appointments (WordPress plugin) · Insecure Direct Object Reference

Affects Simply Schedule Appointments (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.

Data as of 14 Nov 2026, 20:44 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 53% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 16 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 14 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
croixhaugSimply Schedule AppointmentsAffected
  • <=1.6.12.10
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict contributor-level access to trusted users only and consider disabling or restricting the affected REST API endpoint if possible. Monitor vendor channels for updates and apply patches promptly once released.

Description

The Appointment Booking Calendar — Simply Schedule Appointments Booking Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.12.10 via the ssa_past_appointments due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to access appointment records belonging to arbitrary users and harvest the per-appointment ownership tokens (32-character hashes) embedded in the rendered HTML, which can then be used without any authentication to read or modify those appointments including full customer PII such as name, email, phone number, and private notes. The /wp-json/ssa/v1/render-shortcode REST endpoint is registered unconditionally on rest_api_init regardless of whether the Divi theme is installed, and its permission callback only requires current_user_can('edit_posts'), meaning any Contributor-level account is sufficient to trigger this entire exploit chain.

References

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