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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-133611: vulnerability-lookup · Cross-Site Request Forgery

Affects vulnerability-lookupSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.6 Medium.

Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 07:34 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
4.6Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (CIRCL)CVSS 4.04.6
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 20 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 19 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
vulnerability-lookupvulnerability-lookupAffected
  • ≥ <7.1.0, < 7.1.0
Fixed in–

CPE configurations (1)

  • cpe:2.3:a:vulnerability-lookup:vulnerability-lookup:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

vulnerability-lookup prior to version 7.1.0 contains two security issues in its web interface. First, the /user/toggle_2fa endpoint accepted HTTP GET requests and disabled the authenticated user's two-factor authentication without requiring password confirmation. Because the state-changing operation was reachable via GET, an attacker with a basic account could embed an image element (or any other GET-triggering markup) in a comment pointing to that endpoint. When a victim with 2FA enabled viewed the comment, their browser silently issued the GET request, disabling the victim's second factor of authentication. No CSRF token was enforced on the GET path, and no password was required to confirm the action. Second, the comment detail page (/comment/<uuid>) rendered unpublished comments to any visitor who possessed the URL, bypassing the moderation workflow that was intended to keep such content hidden until approved. The API correctly restricted access, but the web view did not enforce the same authorization check. The combined effect allows an attacker to degrade a victim's account security (removal of 2FA) through a single page view and to read content that was not yet approved for public release.

References

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