CVE-2026-14245: miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications (WordPress plugin) · Missing Authorization
Affects miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.
Data as of 21 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC
- EPSS
- 1.0% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 65% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 9 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 21 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| cyberlord92miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until an official fix is released, it is recommended to disable the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration and/or configure the plugin to enforce phone-only reset to prevent exploitation. Monitor vendor channels for updates and apply patches promptly once available.
Description
The miniOrange OTP Login, Verification and SMS Notifications plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Administrator Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.5.1. This is due to the `um_reset_password_process_hook()` function performing no server-side verification that the OTP validation step was completed, and relying solely on a public `form_nonce` nonce that the plugin itself emits to unauthenticated visitors via the `moumprvar` JavaScript object on the Ultimate Member password reset page, while still accepting the attacker-controlled `username_b` parameter to target any WordPress user without role restriction or any binding to a previously validated OTP session. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain a freshly generated password-reset URL for an arbitrary Administrator account — returned in a 302 `Location` header — and use it to take full control of that account. Exploitation requires the Ultimate Member Password Reset Form integration to be active and the plugin to not be configured for phone-only reset.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d34f4e77-f384-4d84-be32-0d349962b614?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.1/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/miniorange-otp-verification/tags/5.5.0/handler/forms/class-moumpasswordreset.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&old=3595061%40miniorange-otp-verification&new=3595061%40miniorange-otp-verification (opens in a new tab)