CVE-2026-14495: DoLogin Security (WordPress plugin) · PRNG
Affects DoLogin Security (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High.
Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 17:35 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 56% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 20 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| wpdo5eaDoLogin Security | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, users should disable the passwordless login feature or the DoLogin Security plugin entirely to prevent exploitation. Monitoring for suspicious login activity related to passwordless tokens is advised. Do not rely on the plugin's current authentication mechanism for security.
Description
The DoLogin Security plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Insufficient Randomness in all versions up to, and including, 4.3. The vulnerability exists because `dologin\s::rrand()` seeds the Mersenne Twister with `mt_srand((double) microtime() * 1000000)` — discarding the integer-seconds component of `microtime()` and constraining the seed to a range of approximately 10^6 values (~20 bits of entropy) — after which every character of the 32-character magic-link token is drawn sequentially with `mt_rand()`, making the entire token a deterministic function of that seed. Because `Pswdless::try_login()` is registered on the unauthenticated `init` hook, resolves the target account by the auto-increment numeric ID embedded in the `?dologin=<id>.<hash>` parameter, performs the hash comparison using a non-constant-time `!=` operator, and then calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` directly — never passing through `wp_authenticate()` and therefore never triggering the plugin's own `Auth::_has_login_err()` lockout — an unauthenticated attacker can brute-force the ~10^6-candidate seed space to reconstruct an active passwordless login token and authenticate as any targeted user, including administrators, without a password. Exploitation requires that a valid, unexpired passwordless login link (active for up to 7 days) exists for the target account at the time of the attack, and that the numeric link ID is known or guessable from the auto-increment primary key.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/16bce371-b524-48eb-8537-3f9df802abd3?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/s.cls.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/dologin/tags/4.3/src/pswdless.cls.php (opens in a new tab)