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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-14781: Red Hat Build of Keycloak · Improper Validation of Consistency Within Input

Affects Red Hat Build of KeycloakSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.8 Medium.

Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.8Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 5 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Red HatRed Hat Build of KeycloakAffected–Fixed in–
Red HatRed Hat Build of KeycloakAffected–Fixed in–
Red HatRed Hat Data Grid 8Affected–Fixed in–
Red HatRed Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion PackAffected–Fixed in–
Red HatRed Hat Single Sign-On 7Affected–Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, avoid setting trustEmail=true in OIDC identity provider configurations or ensure the upstream OIDC provider is fully trusted and secure. Review application reliance on the email_verified claim and consider additional verification mechanisms.

Description

A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.

References

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