CVE-2026-14781: Red Hat Build of Keycloak · Improper Validation of Consistency Within Input
Affects Red Hat Build of KeycloakSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.8 Medium.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Red HatRed Hat Build of Keycloak | Affected– | Fixed in– |
| Red HatRed Hat Build of Keycloak | Affected– | Fixed in– |
| Red HatRed Hat Data Grid 8 | Affected– | Fixed in– |
| Red HatRed Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Expansion Pack | Affected– | Fixed in– |
| Red HatRed Hat Single Sign-On 7 | Affected– | Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, avoid setting trustEmail=true in OIDC identity provider configurations or ensure the upstream OIDC provider is fully trusted and secure. Review application reliance on the email_verified claim and consider additional verification mechanisms.
Description
A flaw exists in the org.keycloak.broker.oidc package where the OIDC broker incorrectly synchronizes the email_verified claim. When an OIDC identity provider is configured with trustEmail=true and the userinfo endpoint is enabled, Keycloak retrieves the email address from the userinfo response but retrieves the email_verified status exclusively from the id_token. The root cause is a lack of validation ensuring that the email_verified claim in the id_token actually refers to the email address returned by the userinfo endpoint. If these two sources return different email addresses, the id_token's email_verified=true claim is blindly applied to the userinfo email. Exploitation Conditions: The OIDC identity provider must have trustEmail set to true (non-default). The userinfo endpoint must be enabled (default). The attacker must control or have compromised the upstream OIDC provider. Concrete Impact: Mark arbitrary email addresses as verified in the Keycloak database. Bypass email-based security controls or verification workflows. Potential account takeover if the application relies solely on the email_verified flag from the IdP to link accounts.