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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-15014: SMS Alert (WordPress plugin) · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Affects SMS Alert (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 59% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 28 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
cozyvision1SMS Alert – SMS & OTP for WooCommerce, Order Notifications & Abandoned Cart RecoveryAffected
  • <=3.9.7
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict access to the affected plugin and consider disabling it if possible. Monitor for updates from the vendor or plugin author and apply patches promptly once released. Avoid exposing or using phone numbers as authentication factors without proper binding and verification.

Description

The SMS Alert – SMS & OTP for WooCommerce, Order Notifications & Abandoned Cart Recovery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.7 via the `billing_phone` parameter. This is due to the `processRegistration()` function using a phone-unbound `$_SESSION['sa_mobile_verified']` boolean flag as the sole gate before issuing an authentication cookie — the flag is set to `true` after any successful OTP validation without being bound to the specific phone number that was verified. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to complete OTP verification for a phone number they control, then resubmit the registration request with a victim's `billing_phone` value to have `wp_set_auth_cookie()` called for the resolved victim account, enabling full authentication as any existing WordPress user whose registered phone number is known or guessable, including administrators.

References

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