CVE-2026-18036: Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVA · Timing Side Channel
Affects Legion of the Bouncy Castle BC-JAVASource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 1.86 soon.
Data as of 15 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.86
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:AmberExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 15 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade BC-JAVA and bcprov to 1.86.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.BC-JAVA | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubbcprovpkg:github/bcprovOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade to Bouncy Castle for Java version 1.86 or later, where the timing side-channel has been mitigated by replacing secret-dependent division operations with constant-time implementations. No other mitigation is required as the fix is included in the official release.
Description
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, NTRU reduced secret values with the % operator in three helpers whose reference implementations are deliberately division-free, so each reduction was carried out by an integer division whose latency depends on the secret operand. Polynomial.modQ divided by a variable divisor, which a compiler cannot strength-reduce to a multiply the way it can a constant one, so it emitted a division on every call including on the decapsulation path where the dividend derives from the private key; Polynomial.mod3 and NTRUSampling.mod3 divided the secret key polynomials f and g during key generation, the message polynomials r and m during encapsulation, and coefficients recovered during decapsulation. An attacker able to measure that timing can recover information about the NTRU private key. modQ now masks, which is exact because q is always a power of two, and mod3 uses the reference implementation's division-free fold and select; the results are unchanged.