CVE-2026-19185: memory-safety in zephyrproject zephyr
Description
The system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c validated the outer struct i3c_ccc_payload, the broadcast ccc.data buffer and the targets.payloads[] array, but did not validate the per-target data buffers those array elements point at. Each struct i3c_ccc_target_payload carries its own data pointer and data_len, and neither was passed through K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() before the payload was handed to z_impl_i3c_do_ccc() and on to the controller driver. The verifier also operated on the caller's live structure rather than a snapshot, so validated fields could be changed by a second user thread between the check and the driver's use — unlike the sibling z_vrfy_i3c_transfer(), which has always copied its message array first. The defect is only present in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, where drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c is compiled. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the I3C controller device object — the ordinary way an application lets a user thread talk to I3C peripherals — can issue a direct CCC whose target payload data pointer names an arbitrary kernel address. Controller drivers dereference that pointer directly (for example drivers/i3c/i3c_mcux.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_cdns.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_stm32.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_npcx.c), using rnw to decide direction. A read CCC therefore causes the kernel-mode driver to write bus-received bytes into an attacker-chosen kernel address for an attacker-chosen length, and a write CCC transmits kernel memory out onto the I3C bus. The result is an out-of-bounds kernel write plus a kernel memory disclosure, i.e. escalation from a user-mode thread to supervisor privilege, defeating the isolation CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide. The fix introduces copy_ccc_and_do(), which snapshots the payload, copies the target array into kernel memory with k_usermode_alloc_from_copy() (bounding num_targets to fewer than 32), validates each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to rnw, and copies the driver-written num_xfer and err fields back to the caller.
CVSS v3.1
Score 7.8high
Affected software
zephyrproject
zephyr
Run on your own infrastructure? Check whether these packages are installed with threat-finder — our free open-source scanner.
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The vulnerability in Zephyr's i3c_do_ccc() system-call verifier arises because it validates the outer structures and arrays but fails to validate the per-target data buffers pointed to by elements in the targets.payloads[] array. These per-target buffers, which include a data pointer and data length, are not passed through the K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() validation before being used by the kernel driver. Additionally, the verifier operates on the live caller structure rather than a snapshot, allowing a race condition where fields can be changed by another thread between validation and use. This flaw exists only in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds. An unprivileged user-mode thread with access to the I3C controller device can exploit this by issuing a direct CCC with a crafted target payload data pointer referencing arbitrary kernel memory. This leads to kernel memory corruption (out-of-bounds write) or disclosure, enabling privilege escalation. The fix involves copying the payload and target array into kernel memory, bounding the number of targets, validating each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to read/write direction, and copying back driver-written fields to the caller.
Potential Impact
An attacker with unprivileged user-mode access to the I3C controller device can exploit this vulnerability to perform out-of-bounds kernel memory writes or read kernel memory, resulting in privilege escalation to supervisor mode. This defeats the isolation provided by CONFIG_USERSPACE, potentially allowing arbitrary code execution or kernel memory disclosure.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. The described fix introduces a snapshot and validation mechanism for the payload and target arrays before passing them to the controller driver, bounding the number of targets and validating per-target buffers. Until an official patch or update is available, restrict unprivileged user-mode access to the I3C controller device to trusted users only.
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- zephyr
- Date Reserved
- 2026-08-06T18:36:11.738Z
- Cvss Version
- 3.1
- State
- PUBLISHED
Threat ID: 6ac360f72cdf04f656dd42c2
Added to database: 10/05/2026, 08:33:59 UTC
Last enriched: 10/05/2026, 08:48:14 UTC
Last updated: 10/05/2026, 18:56:34 UTC
Views: 19
Community Reviews
0 reviewsCrowdsource mitigation strategies, share intel context, and vote on the most helpful responses. Sign in to add your voice and help keep defenders ahead.
Want to contribute mitigation steps or threat intel context? Sign in or create an account to join the community discussion.
Actions
Updates to AI analysis require Pro Console access. Upgrade inside Console → Billing.
Need more coverage?
Upgrade to Pro Console for AI refresh and higher limits.
For incident response and remediation, OffSeq services can help resolve threats faster.
Latest Threats
Check if your credentials are on the dark web
Instant breach scanning across billions of leaked records. Free tier available.