CVE-2026-22866: ensdomains ens-contracts · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Affects ensdomains ens-contractsSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.7 Low.
Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 10% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:UExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 25 Feb 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ensdomainsens-contracts | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubensdomains/ens-contractspkg:github/ensdomains/ens-contractsOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
To mitigate this vulnerability, ENS operators and developers should immediately deploy the patched versions of the RSASHA256Algorithm and RSASHA1Algorithm contracts that correctly implement full PKCS#1 v1.5 padding verification. ENS administrators must update the DNSSECImpl contract's setAlgorithm pointer to reference the patched contracts to ensure proper signature validation. Domain owners and users should verify that their ENS clients and infrastructure are updated to use the fixed contracts. Additionally, ENS users should exercise caution when interacting with domains under the .cc and .name TLDs until patches are applied, as fraudulent claims are possible. Monitoring ENS domain registrations for suspicious activity in these TLDs is recommended. For future resilience, ENS should consider deprecating support for RSA keys with low public exponents (e=3) and adopt more secure cryptographic algorithms and signature verification methods. Regular security audits of smart contracts and cryptographic implementations should be enforced to prevent similar issues.
Description
Ethereum Name Service (ENS) is a distributed, open, and extensible naming system based on the Ethereum blockchain. In versions 1.6.2 and prior, the `RSASHA256Algorithm` and `RSASHA1Algorithm` contracts fail to validate PKCS#1 v1.5 padding structure when verifying RSA signatures. The contracts only check if the last 32 (or 20) bytes of the decrypted signature match the expected hash. This enables Bleichenbacher's 2006 signature forgery attack against DNS zones using RSA keys with low public exponents (e=3). Two ENS-supported TLDs (.cc and .name) use e=3 for their Key Signing Keys, allowing any domain under these TLDs to be fraudulently claimed on ENS without DNS ownership. Apatch was merged at commit c76c5ad0dc9de1c966443bd946fafc6351f87587. Possible workarounds include deploying the patched contracts and pointing DNSSECImpl.setAlgorithm to the deployed contract.