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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-26717: richie · Timing Side Channel

Affects richieSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.8 Medium.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.8Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 37% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 25 Feb 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubopenfun/richiepkg:github/openfun/richieOther threatsAffected
  • *
Fixed in–

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AI-suggested

To mitigate CVE-2026-26717, organizations should immediately review and update the HMAC signature verification implementation in OpenFUN Richie LMS. Specifically, replace the non-constant time equality operator (==) with a constant-time comparison function such as hmac.compare_digest() in Python, which prevents timing side-channel leaks. If an official patch is released, apply it promptly. In the absence of patches, consider implementing network-level mitigations such as rate limiting and anomaly detection to identify suspicious authentication attempts that may indicate timing attack probing. Additionally, monitor LMS logs for unusual patterns of failed signature verifications or repeated requests from the same source. Educate developers and security teams about the risks of timing attacks and enforce secure coding practices for cryptographic operations. Finally, conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing focused on authentication mechanisms to detect similar vulnerabilities proactively.

Description

An issue in OpenFUN Richie (LMS) in src/richie/apps/courses/api.py. The application used the non-constant time == operator for HMAC signature verification in the sync_course_run_from_request function. This allows remote attackers to forge valid signatures and bypass authentication by measuring response time discrepancies

References

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