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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-28742: Naxclow Smart Doorbell X3 · Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key

Affects Naxclow Smart Doorbell X3Source CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.2 Critical.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
9.2Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 26% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 12 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
NaxclowSmart Doorbell X3Affected
  • =All
Fixed in–
NaxclowX Smart HomeAffected
  • =All
Fixed in–
NaxclowV720Affected
  • =All
Fixed in–
Naxclowix camAffected
  • =All
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, users should be aware of the risk of device impersonation and avoid exposing devices to untrusted networks. Monitoring for unusual device behavior may help detect exploitation attempts, but no specific mitigations are provided by the vendor at this time.

Description

Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.

References

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