CVE-2026-2899: Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack (WordPress plugin) · Missing Authorization
Affects Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 14% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Mar 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| techjewelFluent Forms Pro Add On Pack | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, restricting access to AJAX endpoints or disabling the vulnerable add-on may reduce risk. Avoid exposing the vulnerable plugin on publicly accessible sites without additional access controls.
Description
The Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 6.1.17. This is due to the `deleteFile()` method in the `Uploader` class lacking nonce verification and capability checks. The AJAX action is registered via `addPublicAjaxAction()` which creates both `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary WordPress media attachments via the `attachment_id` parameter. Note: The researcher described file deletion via the `path` parameter using `sanitize_file_name()`, but the actual code uses `Protector::decrypt()` for path-based deletion which prevents exploitation. The vulnerability is exploitable via the `attachment_id` parameter instead.