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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-31411: Linux kernel · net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · fixed in e3f80666c2739296c3b69a127300455c43aa1067 : update Linux kernel when convenient.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 21:49 UTC

Severity
Unrated

Rated by Threat Radar · No CVSS score from NVD or the CNA

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Limited control over the software or limited information exposure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-11-05.

Patch
Available – fixed in e3f80666c2739296c3b69a127300455c43aa1067, c96549d07dfdd51aadf0722cfb40711574424840, ae88a5d2f29b69819dc7b04086734439d074a643 +5

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Apr 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 5 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < e3f80666c2739296c3b69a127300455c43aa1067
Fixed in
  • e3f80666c2739296c3b69a127300455c43aa1067
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < c96549d07dfdd51aadf0722cfb40711574424840
Fixed in
  • c96549d07dfdd51aadf0722cfb40711574424840
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < ae88a5d2f29b69819dc7b04086734439d074a643
Fixed in
  • ae88a5d2f29b69819dc7b04086734439d074a643
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 440c9a5fc477a8ee259d8bf669531250b8398651
Fixed in
  • 440c9a5fc477a8ee259d8bf669531250b8398651
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 69d3f9ee5489e6e8b66defcfa226e91d82393297
Fixed in
  • 69d3f9ee5489e6e8b66defcfa226e91d82393297
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 21c303fec138c002f90ed33bce60e807d53072bb
Fixed in
  • 21c303fec138c002f90ed33bce60e807d53072bb

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send() Reproducer available at [1]. The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged: int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL); // become ATM signaling daemon struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... }; *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef; // fake vcc pointer sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(), or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values. Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found. Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to keep the vcc alive while it is being used. Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns. However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race only affects the logical state, not memory safety. [1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3

References

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