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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-31707: Linux kernel · ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()

Affects Linux kernelSource GCVE Database

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High · fixed in 7.0.0-27.27 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 2% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 7.0.0-27.27, 7.0.0-1008.8, 7.0.0-1007.7 +4
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 1 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinuxpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux@7.0.0-27.27?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • <7.0.0-27.27
Fixed in
  • 7.0.0-27.27
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-awspkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-aws@7.0.0-1008.8?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • <7.0.0-1008.8
Fixed in
  • 7.0.0-1008.8
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azurepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure@7.0.0-1009.9?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 6.17.0-1003.3 – 7.0.0-1009.9
10 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-azure-fdepkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-azure-fde@7.0.0-1008.8?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • 7.0.0-1003.3 – 7.0.0-1008.8
4 affected builds
Fixed in–
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-gcppkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-gcp@7.0.0-1007.7?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • <7.0.0-1007.7
Fixed in
  • 7.0.0-1007.7
Ubuntu 26.04 LTSlinux-ibmpkg:deb/ubuntu/linux-ibm@7.0.0-1009.9?arch=source&distro=resoluteOther threatsAffected
  • <7.0.0-1009.9
Fixed in
  • 7.0.0-1009.9

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A patch is available and should be applied by updating to Linux kernel versions 6.8.0 or later, or the corresponding fixed Ubuntu kernel packages as listed in the vendor advisory USN-8488-1 and USN-8488-2. After updating, a system reboot is required to apply the fixes. Due to an ABI change, third-party kernel modules must be recompiled and reinstalled. Follow the vendor's update instructions carefully to ensure full remediation.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow: KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed. This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.

References

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